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How can executive agencies in developing countries implement international conventions 
against corruption? This paper looks at the legal issues presented by the Council of Europe, 
United Nations and OECD conventions against corruption; as well as the choices which 
executive agencies (such as the tax police, customs and border guard) in developing countries 
have in helping to implement these conventions. This paper reviews the potential obligations 
which these Conventions impose on executive agencies and the legal principles which should 
be enshired in executive regulation which translates these conventions into practice. This 
paper provides a simple legal/administrative test for corruption as well as tests for 
complicity, respondeat superiour, and tests which help establish jurisdiction between 
departments and between countries (in international corruption cases). The paper also 
discusses mechanisms for financing anti-corruption work, the conduct of tests or probes of 
civil servant bribe-taking behaviour, and the optimal fine to apply to businesses engaging in 



















For over 10 years, organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the United Nations (UN), have 
been helping developing countries adopt legal measures to fight corruption.
1 However, such 
work has had questionable impacts on reducing corruption. Figure 1 plots a variable which 
measures the extent to which several Central and Eastern European countries have adopted 
anti-corruption conventions against the extent to which “public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption.”
2 This figure shows no correlation 
across countries between the extent to which a country adopts anti-corruption conventions and 
the ability of its administrators to fight against corruption. Indeed, if a general trend is 
discernible among these data, public administrations of countries who have adopted anti-
corruption conventions tend to be more controlled by corruption.
3 These data suggest that 
these anti-corruption conventions have relatively little impact on corruption.
4   
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Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005) and Steves and Alan Rousso (2003) 
 
 
                                                
1 In fact, recommendations issued by these organisations extend back almost 20 years. Such “legal measures” 
have consisted of negotiated agreements for chaning national legislation (as adopted by the national parliament) 
as well as advisory missions aimed at advising executive agencies about the quality of regulation (such as 
administrative degrees, orders, acts and decisions) and advice to criminal, civil and administrative courts related 
to technical issues such as case management. While acknowleging the wide range of other actors supporting 
legal reform affecting developing countries’ fight against corruption (such as ministeries of justice in many 
European Union countries, the US Department of Justice, and the American Bar Association’s Central and 
Eastern Europe Law Initiative) and the number of other multilateral and bilateral treaties, recommendations and 
opinio juris concerning the fight against corruption, I focus on these three organisations due to their importance.  
2 The conventions covered include the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI), the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the Council of Europe’s (COE) Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption, the COE’s 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, and the COE’s Group 
of States against Corruption (GRECO). The control of corruption indicator scores countries relative to each other 
instead of an absolute scale.  
3 Naturally, two opposing explanations may account for such a relationship in these data. On the one hand, the 
adoption of anti-corruption conventions may simply be ineffective (and possibly even contribute to corruuption 
by encouraging the country to delay real reforms which tackle corruption). On the other hand, corruption ridden 
countries may be the most eager to adopt anti-corruption conventions. However, given the over 10 years of work 
related to these conventions, if they were effective, the effects would be seen by now.   
4 Steves and Rousso (2003) support this conclusion with regression analysis. In their study, they find that the 
adoption of anti-corruption conventions is not statistically significantly correlated with levels of corruption in a 
country as measured by surveys of businessmen working in the country being asked about (while controlling for 
factors which may influence the analysis).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 3 
 
The UN, OECD and CoE conventions against corruption have been under-effective 
because these conventions, while being ratified by national parliaments, are not being 
implemented in executive agencies most prone to corruption – particularly the traffic police, 
the police, customs, and tax inspection (Emmert, 2003). Agency-level implementation in 
many developing countries has not occurred for (at least) two reasons. First, the development 
and application of many of the legal principles which help insure civil servant accountability 
(and which prosecutors or instructing judges rely upon in trial) remains at a lower than in 
developed OECD countries.
5 Resort to civil law, administrative law, criminal law, and 
contract law is difficult and costly. Unlike in OECD countries, in cases where the law is 
silent, no jurisprudential tradition helps inform judges to take the decisions which contribute 
to an effective “stock” of regulation.
6 Second, the provisions in these conventions often do not 
take into account the political or economic costs involved in implementing the provisions of 
the anti-corruption laws which these countries ratify. Many of the points, related to the 
criminalisation of bribery, the cleaning of party finance and international asset seizure are 
expensive to implement and not in the interests of parliamentarians or executive agencies to 
implement.
7   
 
Drawing on a range basic legal concepts, this paper provides concrete judicial tests 
which can be used by executive agencies in order to implement the provisions of the main 
international conventions against corruption. The paper starts by the core legal logic behind 
imposing sanctions against corruption -- providing a test for corruption which helps 
administrators to differentiate between corruption and legitimate gifts). The legal logic of 
corruption as a breach of contract helps clarify the liability of superiors and colleagues 
(conspirators), as well as helps establish appropriate jurisdiction for corruption offenses. By 
looking at the economics underlying anti-corruption regulation, optimal methods of internal 
investigation, finance and the application of remedies can help overcome the poor incentives 
civil servants have to implement these conventions.
8 This paper seeks to provide practical 
guidance (inspired by the academic and practitioner literature on the subject) for the advisors 
of executive agencies working in Central and Eastern Europe who are looking to help 
implement international conventions in executive agencies, particularly in those agencies 
which are most prone to corruption (such as customs and traffic police).
9  
                                                
5 A number of measures of judicial quality suggest that judicial systems in developing countries are less 
developed than those in OECD member countries (see Dakolias 2005 for a discussion of the different measures).  
Ofosu-Amaah et al. (1999) discuss the legal framework related to fighting corruption in detail.  
6 As argued in Michael (2004), public sectors in developing countries particular need to develop such a “stock” 
of effective regulations in fighting corruption because no accepted theory or textbook exists on fighting 
corruption.  
7 Michael (2007) attempts to assess the extent to which recommendations to parlimanetarians are “incentive 
compatible” (in their political interests to implement). A number of articles discuss the calculation of costs and 
benefits in implementing anti-corruption programmes; providing an economic explanation for the lack of 
implementation of anti-corruption activities.  
8 This paper takes an unabashedly Nw Institutional Economics view of legislation and regulation, viewing the 
optimality of regulation as a function of its social costs and benefits. While I acknowledge such a view of law 
has its opponents, the lack of implementation of anti-corruption laws (and the overwhelming evidence 
suggesting that few incentives existing in developing countries to implement these law) suggests that a 
economic-based view of law may serve as a useful tool – when used with other legal philosophies, to help 
promote implementation. See Medema (1997) for more on the pros and cons of New Institutional Economics in 
legal analysis.  
9 While most of the issues addressed in this paper are relevant for all developing countries, this paper specifically 
focuses on Central and Eastern Europe due to the large amount of technical assistance the UN, CoE and OECD 
provide to this region in support of these conventions (for reasons whose discussion lies outside of the bounds of 
this paper). Despite the Continental system of law used in this region, I have purposely decided to use Anglo-
Saxon legal principles and terminology to explain many of the arguments to a English-language readership. Such QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 4 
 
 
While an academic should be comfortable with the method of argumentation 
employed in this paper (and hold a sufficiently critical attitude toward the material covered), 
the director in a customs agency or expert in the legal department of an anti-corruption agency 
should keep several caveats in mind. First, this paper seeks to illustrate a regulatory approach 
(a method of reasoning) instead of provide definitive legal judgments. Because each country 
has a differing legal tradition (which will change over time), the arguments in this paper must 
be incomplete and can not consider the various legal principles which impact on a particular 
argument.
10 Second, the material covered in this paper concerns mostly developing countries 
(and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe). In developed OECD countries, sufficient 
legal tests of corruption have been developed and the quality of legal/regulatory enforcement 
(and international co-operation) is such that these laws do not need to be self-financing or 
incentive-compatible (as will be defined in this paper).   
The (Mis)Implementation of Anti-Corruption Treaties  
 
  While a number of international conventions, recommendations and treaties exist 
related to fighting corruption, three treaties have been particularly influential among 
policymakers – namely the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Corruption, the OECD 
Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and the 
two Council of Europe (CoE) treaties establishing civil and criminal liability in corruption 
cases.
11 Figure 2 provides a summary of each of these conventions and the areas on which the 
convention focuses.  
 
  In theory, the implementation of these anti-corruption conventions follows the four-
stage procedure outlined in Figure 3.
12 First, country representatives and ambassadors to the 
OECD, UN and the Council of Europe negotiate the provisions of the overall convention.
13 
Second, national parliaments consider the convention and make modifications in light of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
a choice has been partly dictated by the application of economic reasoning (which is much less amenable to the 
Continental legal tradition (which much less readily accepts the importation of economic ideas due to its 
different conception of the foundation of rights, the nature of society and the role of the judicial system). Yet, 
this paper represents another (of a wide range of research) which contributes Anglox-Saxon ideas to the 
Continental system in areas where no apparent conflict between the two traditions would invalidate the ideas 
presented in this paper. See Helmholtz (1990) for more on the increasing convergence between these two legal 
traditions and Emmert (1990) for a discussion of the Central and Eastern European legal tradition (which has in 
some ways mixed these two legal traditions). For an interesting application of common law practices in a 
continential law tradition, see Frase (1990). 
10 To this end, I avoid citing particular legislation or supporting regulation in order to avoid the appearance that I 
am making specific legal claims.  
11 For these treaties, see the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006). Surprisingly, not much academic 
work has been done analysing these treaties, except for Abbott and Snidal (2002) or Posadas (2000) as some 
examples. Schroth (2002) discusses the impact of the main international anti-corruption conventions. However, 
he only considers their effects on the US and provides an analysis of judicial interpretations of the provisions of 
the conventions which have been adopted into US law. The extremely complicated nature of US law probably 
forced the author to exclude a detailed discussion of cases involving US civil servants and or a discussion of the 
ways which the various US departments have worked to promote the implementation of these Conventions.  
Unfortunately, while the US legal tradition is the least applicable to these countries, it’s legal traditions are the 
most researched (given the  
12 Figure 3 represents an idealised and highly simplified version of the adoption process aimed at the reader 
which any prior knowledge in the area. See Levinson (1999) for more on the adoption of laws aimed at 
supporting the ratification of international anti-corruption conventions.  
13 For a discussion of the politics involved in the negotiation of the OECD, see Posadas (2000).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 5 
 
country’s legal traditions as well as the political constraints.
14 Third, once parliament ratifies a 
law or statute which implements the main provisions outlined in the convention, each ministry 
nominated in the law (or which is affected by the law) develops a set of regulations which 
define more specifically the method by which the implementing agency will enforce the 
law.
15 Fourth, these regulations come under constant review, both internally (as agency 
officials take practical decisions which impact upon the way public officials use public 
power) as well as by administrative courts.  
 
Figure 2: The Main Anti-Corruption Conventions 
 
Convention  Description  Selected Areas of activity 
UN Convention Against 
Corruption  
Signatories establish criminal 
liability for corruption within their 
own countries. Covers wide 
membership of the UN.  
criminalisation of bribery, 
embezzlement, asset recovery 
CoE Civil Convention Against 
Corruption 
Allows private persons to sue 
government or other persons for 
damages arising from corruption.  
individual and group 
indemnification for corruption  
CoE Criminal Convention 
Against Corruption 
Criminalises participation in 
corruption for civil servants and 
non-government counterparts.  
criminalisation of corruption 
OECD Convention*  Establishes criminal liability for 
bribes paid by businessmen from 
OECD countries to government 
officials from any country.  
Criminal responsibility for 
corruption abroad, extradition, 
information sharing.   
Note: This table only covers the main concrete provisions of each convention. Each convention establishes a 
number of vague principles related to accountability and transparency which have not (and probably can not) be 
implemented in practice.  
* The OECD hosts mutual monitoring meetings, whose results sometimes affect national legislation in the CEE 
region. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary undergo monitoring by the Working Group on the Anti-
Bribery Convention while Ukraine, Moldova and several other Eastern European countries used to undergo 




                                                
14 For an excellent and detailed discussion of the trade-off between legal and political concerns in the ratification 
of the OECD Convention, see Abbott and Snidal (2002).  
15 These regulations may consist of high-level directives, decisions, degrees or a range of administrative acts and 
decisions. A detailed discussion of the how executive agencies draft and implement regulations falls outside the 
scope of this paper.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 6 
 
Negotiation at International Sphere
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Ministry 
of Justice
Figure 3: Implementing International Conventions Against Corruption
in the Continental Legal Tradition

















  Figure 3 highlights the systemic nature of anti-corruption which is often pointed out 
by anti-corruption practitioners. For example, Langseth et al. (1997) note that anti-corruption 
programmes form a system and each organisation serves as a “pillar of integrity.” Doig and 
McIvor (2003), using less mythological references, refer to “holistic reform” involving the 
legislature, executive, judicial system, business and non-governmental agencies. Clearly, 
Figure 3 shows the mechanisms by which such a system develops – namely as an evolving 
corpus or system of anti-corruption law which aims at fighting corruption.
16 Such a 
corpus represents a body of administrative law – namely the set of parliamentary decisions, 
decrees by senior officials of executive agencies, decisions, directives, other administrative 
acts and rulings by administrative courts as well as informal customs and institutions which 
aim to reduce the use of public power for private gain.
17 Ultimately, the executive agencies 
which interact with the public will implement administrative acts which put into practice the 
broad principles defined in the international instruments such as the two Council of Europe 
conventions, the OECD convention and the UN convention.
18  
 
A number of legal issues emerge as this corpus of implementing regulations develops 
in Central and Eastern Europe.
19 Figure 4 describes several of the issues raised by these 
international conventions which the executive agencies will need to address. The figure also 
discusses the activities which the conventions (and international work in general) forsees in 
order to address the particular problem. The general trend of the international conventions 
discussed has been to increase penalities for corruption and increase resource and time 
                                                
16 Naturally, such an evolutionary perspective on law represents only one view of law. See Dershowitz (2002) 
for a highly readable exposition of this approach to law in the Common Law tradition or Smith (1988) for a 
similar “institutionalist” approach to public law. 
17 For example, most countries in Central and Eastern Europe will have an anti-corruption law, a strategy which 
is approved by Parliament, an act signed by the Council of Ministers, a freedom of information act, a civil 
servant law, a public procurement law, and other laws aimed at fighting corruption. See Ofosu-Amaah et al. 
(1999) for more.  
18 Such a view opposes the “legislative fetishism” practiced by many policymakers in Central and Eastern 
Europe and their Western advisors. See Channel (2005) for more and Galinou  (2005) for problems the legal 
transplants. The problem of “legal transplants” (the adoption of laws from other countries) has well-known 
problems (Damaska, 1997). The adoption of these conventions does not represent a “transplant” per se (because 
the law in theory represents the negotiated outcome of a law which best suits all countries and does not derive 
from any one particular country). However, the strong influence of particular laws (particularly the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act) make the adoption of these conventions quasi-transplants. 
19 Galligan and Smilov (1999) provide a discussion of administrative law in Central and Eastern Europe.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 7 
 
burdens on signatory governments (without making provision for more finance or skills 
required to assume the responsibilities forseen in these conventions). The conventions 
offer almost no guidance to implementing authorities about the supporting regulation required 
within executive agencies in order to help implement these conventions.  
 
Figure 4: Issues Involved in the International Conventions Relevant for Executive 
Implementation 
 
Issue  Description of Problem  Problem Result in 
Executive Agency 




The definition of corruption is 
still a contested issue with 
Transparency International in 
particular pushing for a wide 
definition which is legally 
difficult to enforce. 
Lack of a definition has 
created many legal 
definitions in CEE region. 
Relies on laws instead of 
public sector ethos.  
Work on public sector 
ethics and work on 
multiple legal 




of corruption  
Corruption offenses become 
crimes as defined by 
Parliament, with a fixed set of 
definable offenses and 
remedies.  
Hazy aspects of corruption, 
particularly related to trade 
in influence, difficult to 
define specifically.  
Executive agencies turn 
over corruption cases to 
prosecutor instead of 
dealing with them directly 
(or often ignores them).  
Identification of 
bribery or risks 
of bribery 
No accepted method of 
identifying corruption 
Executive agencies take 
“passive” approach to 
corruption (waiting until 
complaint is made). 
Implementing “tougher 
laws” and increasing 
restricting rights and 
activities of civil servants.  
Burden of proof, 
treatment of 
evidence 
Corruption needs tangible 
proof. Proof hard to obtain as 
its an activity conducted in 
secret. Criminalisation makes 
evidentiary burden “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” 
Evidence difficult and 
expensive to collect; few 
willing witnesses; 




protection, provisions for 
anti-corruption education 
and co-ordination 
between departments.  
Indemnification 
for corruption 
Victims of corruption have 
almost no recourse to recover 
funds and/or seek damages for 
corruption-related harms 
(though CoE Convention 
provides in theory). 
No mechanism in place to 
either hear cases or to pay-
out indemnities. 
CoE Civil Convention 
offers strongest remedies. 
OECD and UN 
convention discuss. Legal 
precedents of suing 
individual government 
agencies increasing.  
Jurisdiction  Vertical jurisdiction: which 
level of agency deals with 
corruption 
Horizontal jurisdiction: which 
government institutions deals 
with corruption 
Forum: which countries deals 
with cross-border cases.  
A corruption case can cross 
a number of jurisdictions 
(and programmes aimed at 
reducing incentives for 
corruption certainly involve 
many departments). 
Jurisdiction a political and 
administrative issue without 
clear criteria for assigning 
jurisdiction. 




                                                
20 The definition of corruption and the adoption of legislation aimed at fighting corruption are closely tied. The 
recent view of corruption as a cross-sector phenomenon involving the public and private sectors (a view which 
has been marketed heavily by the World Bank and Transparency International) has militated for the adoption of 
a single law aimed specifically at defining corruption and adopting measures to fight it. The classic view that 
corruption stems from civil service weaknesses (poor organisation, low salaries, insufficient materials, low 
training) militates for a regulations which span legislation involving a wide number of civil service and political 
issues. The UK, for example, has preferred to deal with corruption by leaving restrictions in a wide range of 
legislation which affects civil servant behaviour.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 8 
 
Figure 4 continued: Issues Involved in the International Conventions Relevant 







Most legal traditions allow for 
state complicity when civil 
servant commits error – 
however little complicity for 
corruption.   
Many agencies implicit 
accept complicity, looking 
at awareness raising and 
other activities to help 
reduce corruption.  
Ad hoc implementation of 
measures which indirectly 
touch on corruption. CoE 
Civil Convention touches 
this issue.  









testing of staff) 
Many corruption controls are 
costly and demoralizing. Such 
controls potentially violate 
civil servants’ or service users 
human rights.  
Executive agencies 
proceeding on ad hoc basis, 
introducing controls which 
seem appropriate. General 
trends is “more control is 
better” without concrete 
evidence to support 
particular methods.  
No agreement on 
activities to undertake. In 
some countries, civil 
servants can be video-
taped and “entrapped” 
(tempted to accept 
bribes). Contracts can 
often allow for 
enforcement (though 
many rights can not be 
signed away). 
Finance   Anti-corruption work needs to 
be self financing in poorer 
countries in order to be 
sustainable. 
Many agencies considering 
keeping part of corruption 
proceeds (which is 
prohibited in many 
countries). International 
donor funding main source 
of current finance for many 
countries.  
Fighting corruption 
generally seen as 
government obligation 
outside of need to be self-
financing.  
Defining Corruption: A Simple Contract Test 
 
  The definition of corruption has been widely debated. In the 1990s, the standard 
definition of corruption was “the (mis)use of public power for private gain.”
 21  More recent 
definitions – particularly promulgated by the international non-governmental organisation 
Transparency International -- have encapsulated “the misuse of entrusted power” either in the 
public or private sector. Such a definition has gained a large amount of credibility in policy 
circles given Transparency International’s large PR activity and close relationship with a 
number of international organizations and national governments.
22  
 
Such a definition of corruption should be avoided for three reasons. First, such a wide 
definition of corruption subsumes every possible form of deceit, deception, or conflict 
between persons – thus providing no definition at all. Second, the nature of the principal-
agent relationship is completely different in the public as opposed to private sector. A civil 
servant is delegated authority by the entire society, through a political process – making 
infractions crimes against the body politik. A private individual enters into a formal or 
informal contract in a company or NGO, whereby the agent serves one or more principals – 
making infractions torts against private persons. Third, a definition of corruption should serve 
a specific legal function. Adequate legal definitions exist for the misuse of entrusted power in 
the private sector – as defined under fraud, theft, and other tort and/or criminal offenses. Until 
the mid-2000s, the field of anti-corruption treated matters relating to the use of public power 
                                                
21 See Johnston (1996) for more on the definition of corruption.  
22 See Larmour (2005) for a description of TI’s policy agenda.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 9 
 
for private gain and the field of corporate governance treated matters relating to the misuse of 
entrusted resources in a private setting.
23   
 
In order to clarify the defintion of corruption, Figure 5 shows the elements involved in 
a corrupt transaction involving the use of public power for private gain. A corrupt transaction 
requires three elements: a) a regulatory distortion which restricts the activities of private 
economic actors, b) a good or service which is subject to these regulations, and c) a pool of 
rents created by this distortion (which serves to finance bribe payments or other forms of 
compensation). A restriction on importing cigarettes provides an obvious example; this 
regulatory restriction creates profits in a black market which can be used to bribe border 











illegal intent to 
create relations
(mens reas and mens actus)





Clearly, a bribe or the use of public power for private gain relies on an informal, 
illegal contract between an economic agent and a government official.
25 A contract consists of 
four elements: an offer, acceptance, consideration and intent to form relations. One side 
makes an offer (either the business person offers to pay for a favor or the government official 
offers to do a favor in exchange for a bribe). The offer must be accepted by the other party. 
The “consideration” can be cash or a favour (paid either directly and now or indirectly and 
                                                
23 Transparency International’s attempt to expand the definition of corruption is legally unnecessarily as well as 
philosophically untenable. Namely, courts have increased increased the applicability of anti-corruption laws to 
cases where civil servants are only indirectly involved. For example, Dugan and Lechtman (1997) note that US 
courts have ruled that the FCPA applies in cases where gifts or facilitating payments are made to representative 
of a company which is wholely or partially owned by a foreign government or in cases where part of a payment 
may be passed on to a foreign official (including politicians). Indeed, the person need only act “instrumentally” 
on behalf of the foreign government (and need not directly be bound by civil service regulations or have a 
government job in the traditional sense).  
24 While the argument is too complicated to make here, in theory bribes or other forms of corruption can only 
occur in the presence of economic distortions which create rents. In brief, in a perfectly functioning market, no 
resources would be available to pay civil servants unless a distortion (like the one shown in Figure 5) were 
present. Moreover, it can be shown that any regulation – including a speed limit – results in the same conditions 
presented in Figure 5. In this case, an individual would be willing to pay more to drive faster and the counterpart 
is not the purchaser of cigarrettes, but society in general. As such, the state will also bear some complicity in 
providing civil servants with incentives to engage in corruption (by creating rent-generating regulatory 
distortions and possibly indirectly or unintentially enabling civil servants to collect bribes).  
25 Such an approach represents a novel interpretation of a contract because contracts made illegally are 
considered null and void in a court, even if they are considered valid by contracting parties (and enforced using 
extra-judicial means). See Haller (1990) for a more detailed discussion of the nature of illegal enterprise.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 10 
 
later). Unlike in a legal contract though, the contract seeks to create illegal relations (as 
corruption is prohibited now by law). Such a relation provides the briber with goods and 
services which he or she is not entitled (either by law or by the civil servant who withholds 
entitlement when seeking a bribe).
26 Corruption is difficult to identify and prosecute because 
illegal relations are often paired with legal relations (namely the individual may cross a border 
more quickly and in exchange for a packet of cigarettes).  
 
A contract-based test for corruption helps to differentiate corruption from gift-giving 
(as well as identify cases of corruption which extends across multiple people or long amounts 
of time).
27 Clearly, illegal relations involve a quantity, quality, speed, friendliness and 
informativeness of a service to which the service user is not entitled. Moreover, consideration 
must be paid for specifically a good or service which has been illegally offered and accepted. 
Encapsulating these principles is a two part test for corruption. If the answer to both questions 
is affirmative, then the transaction involves corruption and if the answer to both questions is 
negative, then the transaction involves a legitimate gift.  
 
Two Questions of the Corruption Contract Test: 
 
1. Has an extra payment been made for the quantity, quality, speed, friendliness and 
informativeness of a service to which the service user has an administratively defined 
right? 
 
2. Was the ex-post delivery of the public good or service made on the ex-ante expectation 
of an extra-payment? 
 
 
  The case in which one of these questions is negative poses a legal challenge. Namely, 
if the individual did not pay (but intended to pay) or paid for a service which he or she did not 
receive, the question of civil or criminal responsibility arises. In this case, the standard test for 
a civil or criminal offense can be applied as to whether either party possessed mens rea 
(intention) and actus reus (act). The test of civil/criminal intention and act will serve for a 
particular case. However, over time, administrators and judges must collect, over time, 
substantive legal principles (discovered in the light of each particular case) which establish 
other tests of corruption.
28   
                                                
26 In many cases, payment is made for particular dimensions or margins of goods or services which these civil 
servants provide. In the New Institutional Economics traditions as applied to law (the approach taken in this 
paper), goods and services can be divided into a number of valuable margins such as the speed, friendliness, 
quality or information provided in a particular transaction. See Furubotn and Richter (2005) for more on defining 
and valuing these rights.     
27 As legislation against corruption is increasing adopted and enforced, parties to corrupt transactions seek ways 
of making bribery more difficult to detect. For example, in a recent case involving the Macedonian customs 
service, bribes to facilitate border crossing were paid to a local restaurant waiters (who may change a truck 
driver 50 euro for a coffee). The waiter would hold these funds and render them to a customs officer later 
(sometimes months later) in exchange for a commission. The truck driver passes more quickly, the customs 
inspector receives a bribe, the intermediary receives a commission and the case of corruption becomes more 
difficult to detect. The treatment of corruption in Figure 5 (and the legal test which follows) derives in part from 
Henning (2001).  
28 In a common law tradition, such a collection of legal principles comprises the ratios decidendis (or the 
substantive part of a ruling) of a number of cases. These ratio are often short phrases which encapsulate the 
principle the judge uses in deciding a particular question. While such rulings do not form law in a administrative 
law tradition, judges, administrators and parliamentarians may make reference to them when interpreting laws QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 11 
 
 
If a transaction fails this test (and is deemed corrupt), liability is needs to be placed on 
each party. While several authors argue that all parties are equally liable for corruption 
offenses, the principle of equal liability contradicts general legal practice of assigning liability 
in civil and criminal cases based on each parties’ responsibility for and contribution to the 
legal infraction. A test of liability – and particularly criminal liability – would assign liability 
based on the principles of mens rea (intention) and actus reus (act).
29 Namely, if the economic 
agent is coerced by the government official, than the government official is clearly at fault 
(having both criminal intent and action) For such coercion, the briber need only show that he 
or she would have faced high costs without paying the bribe and that in that particular 
situation, the need to pay was probably clear and pressing.
30 Failing this test suggests that the 
business person was responsible; and liability falls to the businessperson. Yet, this question 
alone probably does not suggest mens reus (intention) on either side because the civil servant 
could be affected by the civil service environment (such as lack of equipment) and the 
businessman could have acted opportunistically instead of with a pre-meditated intent to 
bribe. However, if one or both sides possessed a habit or developed methods of 
soliciting/paying bribes, then corruption was clearly pre-meditated and thus a criminal 
offence. If a businessman both had an urgent need to pay a bribe and a regular system of 
paying, then the fault clearly lies with the public administration and the individual should not 
face criminal liability.
31   
 
 
Two Questions for a Criminal Liability Test for Corruption: 
 
3. Did a clear and present need exist for the economic agent to provide consideration, in 
whose absence, the agent would face considerable personal costs? 
 
4. Did either party possess a habit, infrastructure, or regularly defined ways of soliciting 
or offering corrupt consideration?  
 
 
The use of a simple 4 questions presented above which test of the presence of 
corruption and liability for corruption help solve many of the problems with anti-corruption 
legal work in Central Europe. First, complete criminalisation is impractical, if not impossible 
given weak judicial systems, low public sector wages, and a culture of corruption.
32 Second, 
these tests helps civil servants (who could become targets of the law) understand the 
                                                                                                                                                   
and regulations. To the extent that decisions are not appealed or do not contradict existing regulations, these 
principles become law.   
29 As will be argued below, while the CoE and OECD Conventions seek to criminalise corruption, in highly 
corruption ridden societies, the establishment of an administrative jurisdiction with civil penalities may help 
promote the rapid and cheap investigation of corruption offenses.  
30 Failing this test does not necessarily place personal liability on the civil servant. In most administrative law 
traditions, the civil servant possesses a dual nature, as a individual and as a employee of the state. As discussed 
below, if the civil servant also had a pressing need to accept a bribe, liability could fall on the state instead of the 
civil servant personally. In this case, either the liability passes directlly to the state, or the civil servant could 
seek indemnification of the state’s contribution to his or her crime.  
31 Criminal law generally allows necessity, duress and consent as general defences to crimes.  
32 A number of studies suggest that judiciaries will be unable to successful prosecute corruption offenses in the 
region (Anderson and Gray, 2006).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 12 
 
principles behind the law rather than simply memorizing laws.
33 Third, the test helps develop 
a jurisprudential tradition in these countries related to corruption.  
Respondeat Superiour and Complicity  
 
  Corruption often involves only two parties because incentives are to keep the 
transaction secret. However, when more than two parties are involved in corruption, then 
additional legal dimensions arise (which are only indirectly treated by the international 
conventions mentioned above). In many circumstances, bribes are often centralized in the 
agency (with agents handing over part or all of the revenue collected to their superiours).
34 
The private sector equivalent consists of middle-men or groups of individuals who either pay 
bribes or know about bribery. As such, scienter (guilty knowledge) extends in both the public 
and private sector. Figure 6 portrays a scenario in which corruption chains exist in the 
government involving accessories to a crime (those who actively collect a share of the bribes) 
and complicity in a criminal offense (those who know about corrupt colleagues). In the 














Figure 6: Legal Responsibility Within and Outside the Government:




In some cases, the superiour be liable for corruption offenses of sub-ordinates if he or 
she failed to exercise sufficient oversight. Yet, even if the superiour exercises reasonable 
oversight over employees, he or she may still be prosecuted under indirect respondeat 
superior.
36 To establish indirect respondeat superiour (such that the superiour is guilty of the 
corruption offenses of sub-ordinates), four conditions must apply; namely the person was 
working on work-related matters, at the place of work and during working hours, in service to 
his or her principal, and action could be anticipated by the principal.
37 The strengthening of 
respondeat superiour would have contradictory effects on level of detected corruption. On the 
one hand, increased senior responsibility provides senior officials with more incentives to 
detect and prevent corruption. On the other hand, criminal sanctions imposed against the 
                                                
33 A number of studies, including Anderson and Gray (2005) find that anti-corruption training is extremely weak 
in the region.  
34 See Sajo (1998) for a description.  
35 The figure presents a simplified description as the law (at least in a common law tradition) defines   
36 The reasonableness of oversight depends on the circumstances and will probably be determined over time in a 
particular agency through decisions about various offences over time (as discussed above).  
37 In this example, the civil servant bears personal rather than professional responsibility. Clearly, if superiours 
know (or are likely to know) about corruption activity of their sub-ordinates, an element of government 
indemnity also exists. The next section will discuss the indemnisation of the civil servant as an individual and as 
a representative of the state.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 13 
 
senior official make him or her less likely to investigate vigorously (as he or she would also 
face penalities).  
 
These two contradicting factors can be analysed using economics. Figure 7 shows the 
amount of detection effort and the value of such effort.
38 Panel (a) shows increasing marginal 
costs as the principal shares criminal liability to the agent. Marginal benefits decrease as the 
probability of finding cases of corruption falls (and thus preventing potential cases before they 
become serious). As shown in panel (b) – which shows a shifted marginal cost curve such as 
that which might be faced in Eastern Europe – the overall level of detection increases as 
superiors face less liability of the corruption offenses of their sub-ordinates!  
 
detection effort
Figure 7: Optimal Public Sector Principals’ Effort in Detection Corruption Offences
price/value 
of detecting 

















Complicity in corruption offenses lies at the heart of third-party responsibility (and 
thus third-party legal liability). Both failure to exercise oversight and failure to engage in a 
sufficient amount of detection effort can make a superior an accomplice to a corruption crime. 
Other civil servants who share bribes or businessmen who change middle-man fees may also 
be complicit in corruption through aiding and abetting a criminal offence. The failure to 
denounce corruption may also be considered as complicity – though the CoE and UN anti-
corruption conventions take an unclear position on the exact extent to which failure to 
whistle-blow involves complicity by third-parties. However, no society (particular in the 
former Soviet Union) wants a culture of denouncers. Thus, again, a test should be in place to 
determine whether an individual should denounce a corruption offence in order to escape joint 
liability.
39 If the person was likely to know about corruption, but the impact of such 
corruption on others is not great, then either a non-lieu would be given or the offence treated 
as a civil (or administrative in the case of the civil servant) offence.
40 In cases where the 
                                                
38 This analysis, like much of the analysis in this paper is redolent of Bensen and Baden (1985). Of course, 
Becker (1968) remains the classic reference for this kind of analysis. 
39 The continential system generally places greater responsibility on individuals to assist the government defend 
society’s interests whereas in a common law system, individuals do not have the same duty of fidelity toward the 
state (which in turn exercises its duty of care toward its citizens).  
40 A discussion about the types of evidence which would establish civil responsibility for complicity in 
corruption are beyond the scope of this paper. However, evidence regarding the person’s relation with the 
suspect, the person’s location and movements are all potentially substantive pieces of evidence which the 
instructing judge (prosecutor/administrative agent) would take into account in deciding whether to forward the 
case.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 14 
 
individual knew about corruption which would significantly affect others, then possible 




Two Questions for a Corruption Complicity Test 
 
5. Is it likely the individual knew about corrupt transaction(s) under consideration?  
 
6. Did the individual know about corruption which significantly adversely harmed individuals 
not party to the corrupt transaction.  
 
 
Political corruption (or the collection of bribes for the finance of a political post) is 
particularly related to such types of corruption. In the election law, a provision can stipulate 
that any winning candidate whose campaign was financed by corruption must resign 
from office -- even if the candidate did not know the funds had been obtained from 
corruption.
42 The discussion about complicity above makes the legal argument for 
introducing this form of liability for politicians. Naturally, the level of proof required will be 
found empirically – namely by an acceptable rate of candidate turn-over (as competition in 
electoral markets will ensure the vigorous application of this law).
43 The economics of 
corruption for politicians is depicted in Figure 8. Marginal costs increase as more bribes are 
collected by his or her associates (as the politician runs higher risks of being discovered and 
investigated). The politician obtains lower marginal benefits (as the proceeds of corruption 
make a high impact on voters already favorably disposed to the candidate and a lower impact 
on extra voters who are less favorably inclined). As shown, an equilibrium level of corruption 
will exist, though provisions which make corruption more costly for the candidate will reduce 
the extent to which he or she participates in corruption.  
 
                                                
41 As in cases of theft or other offences, a particular level of harm often determines whether an offence is 
statutorily defined as a crime and a civil offence. The most obvious measure of harm in cases involving bribery 
consists of the financial value of the bribe involved. In the early stages of using this test, judges and 
administrators may interpret the phrase “significantly adversely” and, over time, embody their deliberations in 
the anti-corruption law as a threshold level.  
42 Such a provision can either also or instead be included in the country’s anti-corruption law (if such a law exists 
in a particular country). The approach taken to date in practice has been to allow political markets to eliminate 
corrupt politicans (and to subject the civil servants who participate in corruption to face criminal liability for 
corruption). Basing the prosecution of politicians for corruption offences in electoral or even civil law (fraud and 
mis-use of funds) can be a practical way to enforce the anti-corruption law.  
43 Political corruption, and the use of corruption laws for political motives, has a long and well-researched 
history. See della Porta and Vannucci (1999) for an approachable introduction to the issues.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 15 
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The Three Golden Rules of Anti-Corruption Regulation in Developing Countries 
 
  In anti-corruption, as well as in most areas of public service delivery, a number of 
golden rules help agencies fulfill their mandate – in this case to fight corruption. The first 
golden rule of anti-corruption regulation is that finance from anti-corruption must be used to 
finance anti-corruption. The intuition behind this is shown in Figure 9, which plots the 
amount of anti-corruption undertaken corresponding with various levels of corruption. In the 
case of a fixed budget to a department (such as the Internal Affairs department of a ministry 
of customs), the anti-corruption level effort is fixed by the department’s line-item budget for 
anti-corruption work. Such funding, depicted as a vertical line, establishes a fixed level of 
anti-corruption work, irregardless of the level of corruption. In the case where funding is 
given based on political events (a general cry against corruption) or based on administratively 
perceived need for anti-corruption funding, funding is tied to a particular level of corruption 
which may not correspond the amount of actual anti-corruption work undertaken by the 
department. Such funding often only occurs at high levels of corruption (as governments tend 
not to fund anti-corruption where no apparent need exists). Figure 9 also shows the 
(downward sloping heavy set line) structural relationship between the level of anti-corruption 
work and the level of corruption (showing the extent to which cops on streets, public auditors 
slouched over desks, and others help dissuade people from engaging in corruption or help 
prosecute them). The figure also shows the case when a department receives anti-corruption 
funding in proportion to its effectiveness at fighting corruption (as the light downward sloping 
line). Figure 9 shows the case where more funding is given than the received as proceeds from 
corruption.
44 The intersection of each financing rule with the structural trade-off determines 
the equilibrium level of corruption and anti-corruption. Such a rule will result in the highest 
amount of long-run, sustainable anti-corruption effort.
45 In this case, over time, funding is 
expected to converge to the level corresponding with the structural trade-off.
46  
                                                
44 Such a proportional funding rule may emerge for law enforcement agencies who are allocated funding to do 
core anti-corruption work based on their effectiveness.  
45 While a discussion of comparative statics involving Figure 9 extends beyond the bounds of this paper, the 
reader can see that the slope of the financial rule between corruption and anti-corruption must be greater than the 
slope of the structural trade-off between these two variables (in order to guarantee continued investment in anti-
corruption).  
46 In practice, most governments follow the opposite logic; restricting funding as anti-corruption work becomes 
more successful (on the grounds the problem is less pressing relative to other problems). The result of such 







Figure 9: The Case for Performance-Based Anti-Corruption Budgets 
structural trade-off






The second golden rule of anti-corruption regulation (in developing countries) is that 
anti-corruption results depend on the extent to which the anti-corruption fighter’s incentives 
are tied to his or her performance. Figure 10, an adoption of the Hart (1995 model) shows the 
level of revenue collection (or detection of bribes) on the y-axis for various distributions of 
proceeds from enforcement activities between the Treasury and the civil servant (on the x-
axis).
47 On the left end of the x-axis, the Treasury (or a party who is not the civil servant) has 
rights over all the proceeds; providing the civil servant will have few incentives to work hard. 
On the right end of the x-axis, the civil servant obtains all the proceeds, he or she will be have 
incentives to be over-diligent – accusing innocent people where enough circumstantial 
evidence may exist (or even engaging in criminal behaviour to increase his or her salary!)
48 
As shown in the Figure, some optimal “pass through” of the proceeds from fighting 
corruption can be defined such that the investigating officer in the ministry of customs, tax, 
border guard or other agency has the optimal incentives to fight corruption.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
to contribute to corruption!). In theory, the optimal level of finance will never (in theory) exceed the point where 
the downward sloping finance curve intersects with the downward sloping structural trade-off curve.   
47 Such proceeds may involve catching civil servants “red handed”, taking money which would be used in 
bribery. In other cases, these proceeds may involve an award tied to the level of social harm prevented by 
preventing specific cases of corruption (as will be discussed below). However, such proceeds may extent to a 
share of extra revenue which revenue generating departments collect when civil servants are not corrupt. For 
example, a customs or tax collection service may collecct $5 million more when a particular civil servant is no 
longer granting dispensations in exchange for bribes.  
48 The pass through of proceeds to civil servants may take a number of forms. Civil servants may either be 
legally entitled to a share of the proceeds or their salary (and promotion prospections) may be tied to their effort 
at fighting corruption.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 17 
 









In practice, government departments engage in a number of activities which help tie 
civil servants’ remuneration to his or her performance in an anti-corruption context. Some 
countries have experimented with a “bounty” system, whereby the civil servant’s department 
keeps a percentage of seizures.
49 In cases where such collections violate law (in most 
countries government departments are not allowed to engage in revenue sharing), a system of 
administrative fines are imposed with can closely replicate such a revenue sharing 
arrangement.
50 Once a department’s revenues are partly determined by civil servant 
performance, civil servant pay can be adjusted through accelerating promotions and the 
paying of perquisites, and the payment of qui tam rewards.
51  
 
  The third and possible most important golden rule of anti-corruption regulation (in a 
developing country context) is that an incentive-based approach to fighting corruption will 
produce superiour results to an approach based on regulations because regulations distort 
both the public and private sectors.
52 In many cases, co-ordination or co-operation failures 
between civil servants create situations where executive regulation can improve productivity 
in anti-corruption work. However, as shown in Figure 11, in many cases, these regulations fail 
to stop the behaviour they target while simultaneously introducing a wide range of real costs 
(such as monitoring and enforcement costs) and economic costs (tied to the opportunity cost 
                                                
49 A number of government departments derive revenue from anti-corruption efforts.  Naturally, internal security 
offices recuperate bribes (if such recuperation is possible). The gain to the government in cases where corruption 
offences have been averted also represents revenue gain (though the realisation of this gain is less obvious as the 
gain derives from a averted harm instead of a direct payment into the government’s coffers).  
50 Revenue sharing schemes are prohibited in most administrative law traditions on the grounds such 
arrangements would create adverse incentives to over-collect. Such a system would also avoid the systems of 
transparency and accountability which govern public sector budgeting, expenditure and reporting. Increasingly, 
particular types of fines are being designated for special purposes instead of simply being remitted into the 
general government budget.  
51 In some civil services in the OECD, higher grade specialist positions are increasingly be created which are 
paid like senior managerial posts, but without the concomitant managerial responsibilities. While such a system 
is sometimes open to abuse, close oversight by the civil service office helps prevent fraud in the system. In some 
Central and Eastern European countries, civil servants are still given perquisites (access to cheap housing, use of 
government resouces) which can increase a civil servant’s real salary by up to 40% in places such as Russia 
(Nunberg, 1998). Qui tam rewards (or rewards paid for providing evidence on a civil servant which leads to his 
or her convinction of corruption or other offences against the state) are covered in the next section – as are the 
remedies which can help mitigate the problems with paying civil servants to do their job.  
52 The trend in fighting corruption has been to implement codes of conduct, conflict of interest rules, asset 
declaration, party finance reform and hundreds of executive level regulations tied from the amount of money 
civil servants are allowed to carry to the number of receipts they must produce for work-related expenses. 
Regulating is almost an instrictive and visceral reaction to a problem in the public sector (see Anechiarico and 
Jacobs, 1998 for one book treatment of the problems involved with anti-corruption regulation).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 18 
 
of doing something else). A regulation, which will create a divergence between actions the 
civil servant would normally take and the action he or she is required to take, will detract the 
civil servant’s attention from other, potentially more productive, tasks.
53 Anti-corruption 
regulations cost money -- money to talk about, to write down and to implement.
54 These 
regulations can often distort markets, not only because they restrict civil servants’ freedom of 
movement but also because they impose an extra tax burden on society.
55 These 
considerations lead to a restatement of the third, and possibly most important, golden rule of 
anti-corruption regulation: 
 
Prime inter pares rule of Anti-Corruption Regulation 
 
A departmental regulation aimed at reducing corruption must balance the corruption reducing 
effects that rule will have with the distortionary effects on the public management 
environment and private markets
56  
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to create and enforce regulations
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53 Figure 11 does not argue against all regulation; as regulations prohibiting civil servants from collecting bribes 
clearly detracts the civil servant’s away from such activites and increases overall productivity. However, 
regulations which force the civil servant to engage in filling out paperwork or change work location every 6 
months clearly imposes costs which may be larger than the gains from reducing corruption.  
54 While such stories abound, a recent code of conduct exercise in a particular Estonian ministry cost of 20 staff 
days and $30,000 in fees to an external consultant. In theory, the department should have conducted a cost-
benefits analysis before engaging in this work (as not a single civil servant could tell me what the code of 
conduct contained).  
55 Regulations often emerge from a crisis in the executive agency instead of a well-reasoned consideration of 
costs and benefits. The result of such regulations is to impose costs on all bureaucratic members while only 
marginally reducing the liklihood of particular acts of corruption. For example, an accounting procedure 
imposing the loss of $40,000 dollars in staff and accountants’ time to prevent $5,000 in stolen or mis-accounted 
funds would be a poor regulation.  
56 As this is a paper on legal aspects of anti-corruption regulation, the rule must address issues related to justice. 
Broadly speaking (because each country’s conception of justice will necessarily vary), the regulation must 
protect the interests of the majority which preserving the rights of the minority (Kolm, 2002). In some sense, the 
role of the agency manager is to push for efficient anti-corruption regulations while the role of (administrative) 
judicial oversight is to ensure that these regulations conform with and help promote the view of justice which has 
evolved with the country’s jurisprudential tradition.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 19 
 
Who to Sue, where to Sue? Jurisdiction for Anti-Corruption Offenses 
 
  Jurisdiction over particular corruption offences should be given to the organisation 
which can most effectively investigate and prosecute the offence.
57 For civil servants, the civil 
servant’s department, the administrative court and the criminal courts all can have a role to 
play in a corruption case. For the private persons caught engaging in corruption or wishing to 
file a complaint against the extortion of a bribe, they may have recourse to civil or criminal 
proceedings. Generally at present, in cases of suspected corruption (or cases where a 
complaint is made), initiation begins in the civil servant’s department. The department may 
conduct an investigation if prima facie evidence for the offence is not forthcoming. In most 
instances, the department is unable to obtain sufficient proof and the matter is dropped. In 
cases where department management wishes to proceed with the investigation or prosecution 
of a corruption offence, they may work with (and/or receive guidance from) an administrative 
court or specialized body dealing with administrative issues. For serious cases (where 
criminal liability is unavoidable), investigators may be called who also frequently drop the 
case for lack of evidence. For complaints received outside, they are handled directly in the 
administrative court or tribunal.
58    
 
  The normative choice of jurisdiction should depend on the relative costs and benefits 
of investigating and prosecuting corruption.
59 Figure 12 shows the marginal benefit of using 
administrative and civil courts (and downward sloping lines reflect the diminishing marginal 
returns to each type of institution). Civil courts are assumed to be more costly (though more 
effective for larger cases of corruption) as reflected by a rightward shifted marginal benefits 
curve. Parties directly involved in corruption (as well as society in general) are assumed to 
incur marginal higher harms (and thus costs) with higher levels of corruption – reflected by 
the upwarding sloping cost curves in Figure 12. In the Figure, private costs are everywhere 
less than social costs (reflecting third-parties who must bear the higher prices, lower 
competition, restricted access to public services and other harms attendant with corruption).
60 
In the Figure, the case should be split up. If only aggregated bribe payers filed suits against 
civil servants, then an division of administrative to civil courts would be set at (a,c). However, 
if other people who are harmed are allowed to bring action against these civil servants, the 
level of corruption falls, and administrative courts take a much heavier share of the legal 
workload (at a*,c*).
61 Administrative courts should take jurisdiction over part of the offence 
and civil courts over another part.  
 
                                                
57 Such a view of jurisdiction is still controversial among public management experts who argue that jurisdiction 
is a political issue as much as a technical issue (relating to government efficiency). See Hood (1999) for an 
interesting view in the UK context.   
58 The obvious question revolves around whether a corrupt civil servant’s boss would press charges against a 
corrupt subordinate? Figure 8 already suggested that under circumstances, the boss will have incentives to turn 
the corrupt civil servant over to the administrative courts (or criminal courts). An audit will be discussed below 
which addresses in more detail how to reduce incentives currently in place which protect corrupt officials.   
59 While the positive determination of jurisdiction depends on political negoation and the resulting law, the 
detailed jurisdiction for corruption offenses is not yet established in many Central European countries.  
60 For example, when a trader pays a bribe to avoid a licence, he or she also acts non-competitively vis-a-vis 
other traders; causing them to lose sales to now cheaper trader. For more on the calculation of these social costs, 
see Michael (2007).   
61 The reader with a background in law may have difficulty accepting the (overly) economistic logic employed in 
this section. However, a wide number of legal scholars are using economic analysis in their legal reasoning 
(Posner, 2003). Authors such as Ogus (2004) note that traditional law enforcement has had difficulty, leading to 
new approaches such as those presented in this paper.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 20 
 





























In most legal traditions covered by the Council of Europe and OECD Conventions, 
victims of corruption can only claim damages for the direct harm caused by corruption (for 
example psychological harm and punitive damages generally can not be claimed). Yet, harms 
to various parties occur beyond the money lost in a bribe payment. The government losses 
tax, customs and other revenue, which the bribe payer losses time and often incurs extra 
expense as a result of corruption. Moreover, remedies available under these conventions 
complete ignore harms to third-parties (such as individuals who must wait in a queue longer 
because of privileged passage by bribe payers). In a scheme where only bribes paid can be 
recovered, the value of anti-corruption is zero (anti-corruption work simply restitutes bribes to 
their rightful owners in cases of extortion) or negative (when court costs are high and  funds 
are not recoverable). Even in an efficient system whereby private costs are recovered quickly, 
the value of anti-corruption work would be low relative to the value of anti-corruption which 
encompasses a broader range of harms. In Figure 12, the value of such a system Vs clearly lies 
about the value of a system allowing only for the recuperation of private costs Vp.  Yet, 
legally justifying a legal system which allows plaintiffs to recover from defendants sums 




Two concepts can help justify the imposition of fines which help internal the external 
harms caused by corruption.
63 Duty of care and qui tam are two legal provisions which 
provide economic incentives to actors to engage in the socially efficient level of legal activity.  
While duty of care is a tort concept (particularly enshrined in Anglo-Saxon law), most 
continental legal traditions place a much higher level of responsibility on government to 
exercise duty of care than the Anglo-Saxon tradition places on the American and British 
government. In the view, the government has a duty of care to provide fair competition, free 
                                                
62 In cases where defendants are unable to pay the fine, the government would indemnify victims (as it does with 
other harms).  
63 Such third-parties are referred to as social bads exhibiting negative externalities. Judicial remedies aimed at 
making perpetrators of corruption offences pay fines equal to the socail harm they cause can be justified in the 
same way that Coasian taxes on pollutors are justified.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 21 
 
passage across a border (subject to the national law), safe streets and other services. Though 
an individual may not be directly involved in corruption, if the government allows corruption 
which damages this third-party, the government has acted negligently toward its duty of care 
and is thus liable for damages caused.
64 The government’s liability in this case is to indemnify 
victims for an amount equal to the social costs minus the private costs as indicated in Figure 
12. To the extent that victims of corruption can file administrative complaints (in the 
department for example where the corrupt civil servant work) for violations of the 
government’s duty of care (which results in economic harms to victims/plaintiffs), then the 
government will engage in the optimal level of anti-corruption activity.
65  
 
Qui tam provisions, which allow any individual to sue the government on behalf the 
interests of the government, are also expected to help internalize the externalities caused by 
corruption (and which victims of corruption are unwilling or unable to sue for in 
compensation). In cases involving corruption, qui tam provisions serve as a bounty for corrupt 
officials and businessmen.
66 The reward for individuals to report cases of corruption would by 
related to the social return identified in Figure 12 for three reasons.
67 First, individuals 
reporting corruption would want a return which equaled the value they generate to society (as 
long as this reward is higher than their own costs). Second, government would want to pay 
out no more than the social value generated by whistle-blowing (and thus the value it receives 
in tax revenue).
68 Third, injured third-parties would be willing to pay part of the harm they 
incur in order to reduce or prevent that harm.
69  
 
The logic is illustrated more fully in Figure 13, which illustrates on a line the costs and 
benefits involved in a simple bribery case in which a third-party denounces a corrupt official 
in exchange for a reward. Panel (a) shows the bribe level (on a line such that positions to the 
right represent higher bribe amounts) and the corresponding amount of social harm. For 
                                                
64 Such a logic will seem unusual for a reader steeped in a common law tradition. For example, a number of 
French plaintiffs have successfully sued the French government in cases of assault and battery involving other 
private individuals and the grounds that the government was responsible for private the law enforcement 
required to forsee and prevent the assault. In general, criminal liability in a common law tradition does not extent 
to omission (except when the defendent is under a positive duty to act). A careful distinction should be made 
between negligence (failing to prevent corruption) and complicity (creating an environment which enables civil 
servants to collect bribes).   
65 As argued in the previous section, tying the payment of harms committed by members of an executive agency 
to its budget increases the incentives to fight corruption. As shown in the last section, government will increase 
anti-corruption work to the extent such work will increase the department’s budget (and its civil servants’ 
compensation). Clearly, if executive agencies can derive revenue from their anti-corruption work, then can also 
be liable to pay indemnities from their own budgets. Legally, the payment of such penalities poses no problems; 
if departments have the legal right to collect fines, they also have the legal obligation to pay them.   
66 The actual effect of these bounties will depend on the extent to which corrupt officials and businessmen can 
“price in” the bounty and the increased probability of being caught during the bribe negotiations. If they can pass 
through these costs, then qui tam provisions may only serve to further redistribute income instead of lead to a 
reduction in the incidence of bribery. For a game theoretic discussion of the design of such a system, see Cooter 
and Garoupa (2001).  
67 In theory, without transactions costs, the reward to the denouncer should exactly equal social benefits from 
denouncing corruption because the denouncer can convince these third-parties that they are better off if they pay 
the denouncer. In the real world, the actual payment to the denouncer is likely to be less than these social 
benefits.  
68 In theory, the government will receive in tax revenue the value of the social goods and services it provides. If 
it provides less, voters will (in theory and in the long-run) vote to reduce the tax level. If government produces 
more value than it earns in taxes, government should provide more goods and services, thus militating for an 
increase in the tax rate.  
69 The landmark citation for the intuition shown in Figure 13 is Coase (1960). See Claeys (2006) for an 
interesting application of similar legal concepts.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 22 
 
example, a person bribing a customs officer may pay $100 which causes $600 in harm to 
other businesspeople (who lose sales). Panel (b) shows a reward level which is higher than the 
whistle-blower’s costs (such a reward must always be higher, otherwise no incentive exists to 
denounce corruption). For example, of the $100 bribe, the denouncer may receive $80 and 
cost the denouncer $40 in time and effort to find and report this incidence of bribery. At the 
level of rewards and costs portrayed in panel (b), the loss to society of corruption is 
represented only by the denouncer’s costs (as the other harms are recoupable). The 
denouncer’s profit is represented by the difference between the reward level and the 
denouncer’s costs. The extra money returned to directly harmed parties is returned -- 
representing a gain to these victims. Parties who are indirectly harmed benefit from the 
discontinuation of corruption.    
 
bribe level  social harm
denouncer’s costs













In cases where the reward exceeds the amount of money involved in the bribe 
transaction, some parties who are indirectly harmed will find it beneficial to pay the 
denouncer.
70 In panel (c), the denouncer’s costs are less than the bribe paid, though the reward 
is much higher; thus the denouncer may incur $80 in costs and receive a reward of $200 
(which is less than the $600 in overall harm to all producers). As a result, part of the 
denouncer’s bounty will be paid by individuals directly harmed by the bribe and partly by 
individuals indirectly harmed. However, because the reward is less than the overall gain 
accruing to third-parties, some of these third-parties will benefit.
71 In panel (d), the 
denouncer’s costs are higher than the amount involved in the bribe transaction; for example 
the denouncer may incur $200 in costs and receive $400 in rewards, though only $300 in 
bribes was paid. In this case, as long as the reward is less than the overall harm to society, 
third-parties will benefit by contributing to the denouncer’s bounty. In this case, third-parties 
(or society as a whole) compensates the denouncer and the gain to third-parties is much less 
than when smaller rewards are paid.
72  
                                                
70 In theory, individual who are indirectly harmed will make Pareto improving payments to the denouncer. 
Usually in practice however, these third-parties are completely dissassociated with the corruption case (and they 
often to directly understand the harms which they experience). Thus, compensation to the denouncer based on 
overall social gain comes from the government budget). In theory, third-parties who are most harmed by bribery 
would be those parties must willing to pay compensation to the denouncer. However, even in theory, predicting 
which third-parties will benefit most from the discontinuation of corruption (and asking for contributions from 
these specific individuals) can only be done with difficulty.  
71 In theory, in the presence of low transactions costs, third-parties who are harmed by corruption can form a 
coalition or class-action in order to divide the gains relatively equally among themselves.  
72 As an interesting aside, in the case where no detection or prevention is attempted, the bribe represents a simple 
redistribution of resources between briber and bribee (thus no economic loss occurs, except for the harms to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 23 
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In case the reward is set too high, the reward can distort incentives, causing qui tam 
provision to do more economic harm than good. Panel (e) shows the case where the reward 
paid to the denouncer is higher than the direct or indirect harms of bribery. In this case, the 
government must resources from other activities in order to compensate the 
denouncer…resulting potentially in lower social returns to other activities. Because the 
denouncer will have an opportunity cost (such as working in a company) the reward could 








Figure 13 continued: The Optimal Theoretical Qui Tam Award in Corruption Cases
(e)
diversion of public resources 
from other uses
diversion of denouncer 
from other productive
activities 
indirect and indirect benefits
 
 
As shown previously, an effective anti-corruption programme provides the same kinds 
of incentives to civil servants to denounce corruption (and to increase work effort aimed at 
investigating corruption). However, paying civil servants to do their duty potentially creates 
negative incentives within the public sector because of the two negative effects describes in 
panel (e), namely distorting the civil servant’s time and government resources. As discussed 
above though, it is possible to design a compensation package which provides blunted 
financial incentives (in the form of promotion or perquisites) without diminishing incentives 
to comply with work obligations. Thus, the optimal high-powered incentive scheme aimed 
at encouraging civil servants to actively fight corruption blunts the incentives paid to 
civil servants to the point where the temptation to divert one’s time and government 
resources into the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences which have low 
                                                                                                                                                   
third-parties). In the case where a bounty-hunter attempts to collect a reward, his or her costs represent a 
efficiency-decreasing transaction cost.  
73 The reader will that the same logic presented in Figure 11 applies in the case in which the reward paid exceeds 
the social loss caused by a corruption transaction. In both cases, individuals are provided with incentives to 
maximise a private or individual return which causes decreases in overall welfare.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 24 
 
expected return are minimized.
74 The previous discussion suggests a simple test to 




Two Questions for Determining the Level of Qui Tam Rewards  
 
1. What was the financial value of the harm done to parties to a corruption offence who hold 
no legal liability and the financial value of harms imposed on third-parties?  
 
2. What payment can be made to engage the investigation of corruption cases while 
simultaneously minimizing the distortion to investigators’ incentives?  
 
Problems of Criminalisation, Defenses, and the Application of Administrative/Judicial 
Remedies 
 
The legal trajectory of the international legal work on corruption (as embodied in the 
UN, CoE and OECD Conventions) points to the increased criminalisation of bribery and 
corruption (and I have repeated referred to criminal offences of corruption). The 
criminalisation of corruption offences in developed OECD countries with effective judicial 
systems has been common practice.
76 However, in countries where judicial systems are weak, 
the criminalisation of corruption offences (as imposed by these international conventions) 
poses serious problems for successfully prosecuting corruption offences.
77 First, criminal 
cases require extensive (and expensive) investigation by the judiciary and prosecutor’s office. 
Yet, resources in these government services are extremely limited and corruption in the 
judicial system is likely to reduce the liklihood of successful prosecutions of corruption in 
other sectors.
78 Second, (as previously discussed) as superiors are legally and administrative 
responsible for the corrupt activities of their sub-ordinates, they have been unwilling to 
strenuously investigate complaints about corruption – in order to avoid prosecution 
themselves! Third, the level of proof required for a successful criminal conviction reduces the 
range of cases which may be pursued. Administrative sanctions against corruption based on 
“balance of probabilities” standard for successful conviction can – in certain circumstances – 
provide greater deterrence against corruption than the ostensibly strong criminal standard 
                                                
74 The optimal payment, which will be less than the equilibrium payment which equals the private plus social 
costs imposed by a particular corrupt transaction, will clearly depend on the civil servant’s income elasticiity of 
labour supply and the extent to which the civil servant internalises the externality through a public service 
motivation or altruism (see Crewson, 1995 for empirical estimates of such a public service motivation). Such a 
payment will necessarily reduce the resources available to compensate victims of corruption crimes and other 
corruption offences.  
75 Such a rule currently emboddies the spirit of the CoE Convention (which does not allow for punitive 
damages). Thus, a conception of justice which ties compensation to harms complies with the spirit of 
international legal work on bribery.   
76 Philosophically, the wide range of social harms caused by corruption suggest that corruption is a crime against 
society (thus consistuting a crime) instead of simply an offence against an individual (consisting a civil law 
infraction or a tort). In advanced countries, the state is unlikely to be negligent towards its duty to uphold the rule 
of law. The effectiveness of criminalisation remains an open question – as countries such as Japan, Italy and 
other countries shows that criminalisation is not a necessary and sufficient condition for reducing corruption.   
77 Posner (2004) provides a useful vade mecum for understanding criminal law traditions in developing 
countries. Salbu (2000) provides an overview of the legislation and institutional change aimed at fighting 
corruption.  
78 The weaknesses in the judicial systems of both countries is covered in the literature previously cited.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 25 
 
which requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
79 Fourth, by increasing the penalities for 
bribery, criminalisation can increase the equilibrium bribe payment. Obviously, bribees need 
to “price in” the additional costs they face if they should be detected. Less obviously, once a 
bribe has been offered, the civil servant bribee can blackmail the briber up to the point where 
the bribe paid equals the money value of criminal sanctions against the briber.  
 
Moreover, a number of defenses which are more widely available in developing 
countries, make criminal liability difficult to categorically establish and attenuate civil servant 
responsibility in cases involving corruption.
80 First, civil servants may rely on the implied 
wishes of their superiours (as discussed in the section on respondeat superior). In a public 
administration rife with corruption, civil servants can argue that speed payments facilitate the 
functioning of government – thereby serving the interests of the department. Respondeat 
superiour serves to dissolve liability and transfer liability to others, reducing the likelihood of 
successfully prosecuting any one particular individual. Civil servants can argue – with some 
validity – that prior failures to investigate and prosecute corruption comprise implicit consent 
for corruption. Second, in countries affected by high levels of corruption, civil servants can 
argue that the government is complicit in bribery – as the government places civil servants in 
positions of temptation with low wages and little effective oversight. Most courts find for 
either diminished responsibility or acquit defendents who are placed in positions of 
temptation.
81 Third, except in the most egrigous forms of bribe-reeking, some form of 
coersion is often present in corrupt transactions. Such forms of coercion can include fear for 
one’s life and safety if one does not participate actively when one’s colleagues participate 
actively, threats made by criminals seeking favours, to more abstract definitions of coercion 
stemming from relative poverty.  
 
The difficulty of prosecuting corruption under a criminal burden of proof as well as 
the large number of mitigating circumstances (which defendents can be as reasonable 
defences) militates for a multiple levels of exclusive (non-overlapping) responsibility. Figure 
14 showd three levels of responsibility which exist (albeit in a highly disarticlated form which 
does not appear in the anti-corruption law) for corruption offences. Managerial responsibility 
aims at tackling incentives leading to corruption and small corruption offences. Managerial 
jurisdiction results in cheap investigations which require little formality. Administrative 
responsibility applies a civil law burden of proof (allowing executives services to deal with 
high risk areas of corruption where obtaining proof is difficult or expensive). Administrative 
cases can be processed quickly and the relatively light penalities make bribing administrative 
judges generally unprofitable. Criminal responsibility applies all the standard procedures as 





                                                
79 Such deterrance is likely if a lower burden of proof facilitates the prosecution of corruption (particularly when 
proof is difficult to obtain). In most EU countries, the accuser of a corruption offense has the burden of proof. In 
the UK, the burden of proof is reversed – namely the civil servant has the duty to show he or she did not 
participate in corruption. While the reversal of the burden of proof for allegations of administrative corruption 
are not appropriate to many developing countries, the UK experience shows that reducing the required standard 
of proof may serve to deter corruption.  
80 For a broader discussion of the issues, see Shavell and Polinsky (2001). 
81 As an obvious example, a court would take a much more lenient view of a starving individual who took money 
left in the open on a public table top than it would of a rich person who took money from a locked safe. Even 
though both cases involve theft, in one case  
82 Naturally, the civil servant and the government department could still face civil liability.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 26 
 
Figure 14: The Harms and Standard of Evidence Required for Corruption Remedies 
 
  Evidence 
requirement 
Types of remedies  Advantages  
Managerial  suspecion of 
corruption 
Written warning, 
reassignment,  pass to 
admin or criminal 
levels 
failure to prosecute opens to 
administrave and criminal liability.  




failure to detect large numbers gives 
admin court liability. contributory 
factors/ accessory to a crime 
Criminal  beyond a reasonable 
doubt 
fine, censure, prison.
83   if criminal prosecution does not 
succeed (because of corruption in 
judiciary), then rely on two other 
levels to obtain partial prosecution.  
  
These defenses show that a legal test should differentiate between personal liability 
and state liability for corruption offences.
84 In most cases, because the state is responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting corruption offences, the state bears no liability for cases where 
civil servants act ultra vires in order collect bribes. However, if executive agencies are 
granted the right to collect money to use in fighting corruption and the obligation to 
indemnify victims of corruption (as discussed above), then clearly executive agencies must 
bear legal liability for corruption offences.
85 In order in provide incentives for the state to 
prevent corruption, the burden of proof can be reversed for state liability as shown in Figure 
15a.  
 
Figure 15a: Dual Liability for Corruption Offenses 
 
  Description  Burden of Proof  Type of 
Responsibility 
Justification 
Personal Liability  The bribee breaks 









The civil servant breaks 
his service 
(employment) contract; 
incurring personal rather 
than derived 
responsibility.  
State Liability  Department 
policies facilitated 
the collection of 
bribes and provided 





Administrative  The state engages in 
contributory negligence 
or at least failing in its 
duty of care toward 
government service 
users.  
                                                
83 Prision time is difficult to justify from an economic point of view given the purely economic nature of 
corruption offences, the resources required to maintain the individual in prison and the questionable deterrance 
and punitive value of imprisionment (see Wickelgren, 2003 for some of the literature and issues).  
84 Clearly, in many circumstances, liability would fall to both the individual and the state for a single offence 
(French administrative law recognises such shared liability under the cumul de fautes principle). Particularly 
French law recognises civil servant fautes which are only possible with money and powers provided by the state. 
Moreover, in cases where several civil servants are found to have commited a similar infraction, they may claim 
compensation from the state for penalties assessed on them personally (Roucault, 2006).  
85 In a continental tradition, legal disputes between government entities are resolved by administrative courts. 
The imposition of rights and obligations on particular executive agencies represents a new area for continential 
law. Clearly, contracts made between executive agencies presupposed that executive agencies can create and 
negotiate over rights and obligations between themselves (and between them and non-government entities). 
However, the imposition of liabilities on one department for policies which are imposed on all executive 
agencies (such as the civil servant renumeration scheme) represents a relatively unchartered area of European 
public law.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 27 
 
 
The reversal of the burden of proof can help with increase prosecutions of corruption 
offences and provide incentives to government policymakers to actively prevent corruption 
for a number of reasons. First, the state clearly has an positive obligation to discourage 
corruption – thus the burden of proof naturally falls on the state.
86 Second, the state is more 
able to bear responsibility for corruption than the individual. Damages in a large corruption 
case are likely to be more than an relative poor civil servant in a developing country can 
bear.
87 Third, the cost of providing documents and other proof (which could convince a 
reasonable person) that no bribes were paid in a specific situation would be extremely high for 
an individual but relatively low for the government.  
 
Corruption offences often involve the violation of several regulations and impose 
liability on several persons or entities. For example, speed bribery involves the violation of a 
number of regulations. Managerial-level violations include failure to maintain discipline, 
dealing in secret with service users, failure to report a criminal activity to management (the 
offer of a bribe). Corruption also may constitute reckless behaviour which puts the department 
at risk (as managers in the department potentially share liability for corruption offences).  
Administrative level infractions include the breach of administrative procedure, placing others 
at risk of commiting a crime (other civil servants who are around and other service users who 
may observe the case), misuse of public assets, abuse of power, violating the code of conduct, 
and possibly perpetrating fraud and deception (if the civil servant claims that the service user 
does not have rights which he or she actually has) as well as theft (if coercion was involved in 
the collection of the bribe). Criminal violations include a corruption offence, possibly theft of 
both state assets (if these assets where granted to service users) or theft of service user assets 
(if the bribe was obtained by coersion). Failing to declare such income may also constitute a 
criminal offence. The civil servant also could hold criminal liability for complicity in 
organised crime (if organised crime groups pay the bribe).
88  
 
As many corruption offenses involve a number of infractions of department, 
administrative and criminal codes, each infraction may fall within a different jurisdiction. To 
the extent that infractions fall in different jurisdictions, remedies can be “cut up” (or divided) 
and the defendent may face trial in several jurisdictions.
89 A three-tiered system of liability 
helps allocate responsibilty to each tier – ensuring a greater level of detection and 
prosecution.
90 Even though criminal liability for corruption may be difficult to prove, the 
                                                
86 In many cases of corruption in developing countries, the state has reasonable forseeability of  
87 Moreover, a criminal trial – which an effective method of ensuring integrity – is psychologically oppressive 
for an individual to bear; a burden better borne by individuals who serve as agents to a institutional principal 
(like the state).  
88 As discussed at some length previously, the civil servant may also bear civil liability if third persons are 
harmed. Corruption involving public procurements are most likely to fall in several jurisdictions as harms can be 
attributed to users of inferiour goods and services, competiting firms (who spend money to participate in a rigged 
tender), the contracting government department, and the procurement agency (whose regulations are violated). 
Provisions in the commercial code (as previous discussed) are violated as are provisions in company law in 
many countries.  
89 Courts have long upheld the view that corrupt transactions involve multiple violations of commercial, civil or 
criminal code. For example, Schroth (2002), citiing 15 U.S.C.  78u(d)(3), notes that "fraud, deceit, manipulation, 
or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement" and increases again if, in addition to this, the 
violation "directly or indirectly results in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial 
losses to other persons." As with court decisions in other countries, this succinct quote shows that penalties 
depend on the harm caused by the corruption offence.  
90 Kaufmann (1994) discusses the case of decreasing returns to enforcement efforts aimed at reducing corruption.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 28 
 
other forms of liability previously discussed may help prosecute at some level (less than 
optimal but greater than zero) corruption offences.  
 
Responsibility for the prosecution of various types of offences related to corruption 
offences should be allocated to the organisation with the greatest incentives and lowest cost of 
prosecution. Figure 16 shows the optimal jurisdiction for a variety of offences discussed 
above (though in the Figure only an administrative and a criminal offence are portrayed). The 
heavy line shows the increasing cost of detecting and prosecuting corruption offences (a cost 
given by the natural underlying technologies and procedures of fighting corruption). 
Compared with these costs are the increase costs to individuals and society for corruption 
offences. As shown, the social cost (the cost to third-parties and society in general) is 
relatively high compared with the private cost (the cost to the agency and the state more 
generally).
91 In the particular example shown in the Figure, in this particular offence, the 
particular offence against the state can be prosecuted within the state (at the departmental 
level) and the infractions hurting society is handled most cheaply and effectively by the 
administrative courts.  
 





















Despite the multiple levels of accountability designed in such a system, the system 
remains a passive system. Namely, executive agencies wait until a complaint is filed or 
suspecions of corruption emerge. As such, an active system of corruption detection is required 
which audits based on risks of corruption. Such a “risk-based” approach to fighting corruption 
has been increasing used in countries as a way of detecting corruption (given that no parties 
have an incentive to complain or denounce corruption).   
Legal Issues Involved in an Active System of Corruption Detection  
 
  At present, most executive agencies employ a “passive” system of risk detection – 
waiting for complaints to be made about corruption.
92 Working within the constraints of such 
a passive system, executive agencies have been unable to detect many cases of corruption. In 
                                                
91 These costs conform with the cost structure shown in Figure 7, as a civil servant will increase his or her anti-
corruption effort as the cost of being involved in a corruption case rises. 
92 Such an approach is codified in law as investigators can not begin an investigation without “reasonable cause.” 
While the criteria of reasonable cause is uncontroversial, such cause to date has been interpreted as a complaint 
lodged against a civil servant, a media revelation, the production of evidence in another case which lead to 
suspicion of corruption).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 29 
 
order to increase the rate of detection of corruption, many countries have instituted onerous 
schemes of inspecting police, customs and border guard officials. Such inspections involve 
psychological tests (inspecting the “propensity” for engaging in corruption), inspections of 
personal effects (including their pockets to ensure they are not carrying excess amounts of 
cash which can not be easy explained). Inspection increasing involves videotaping civil 
servants (in the hopes they will forget they are being taped)!
93 Asset declaration represents a 
recent attempt to impose an inspection regime on civil servants (such that the possession of 
assets whose value far exceeds the civil servant’s salary would raise a red flag).  
 
Such procedures are (and should be) being phased out for three reasons. First, they are 
neither cost efficient nor effective. Just as extensive searches carried out by customs of goods 
crossing a border or extensive searches of financial transactions by tax police are being 
phased out, so must an inspection system which attempts to conduct blanket searches.
94 
Second, they potentially intrude on the civil servant’s right to privacy. In many OECD 
country judicial systems, government authorities can search or conduct in-depth investigation 
only with “reasonable cause.”
95 In almost all cases, the only evidence which senior level 
government administrators can rely upon is based on hear-say which would not credibly 
constitute evidence in an administrative, civil or criminal proceeding.
96 Third, they encourage 
civil servants to seek other ways of engaging in corruption which are not detectable by 
existing types of monitoring. Under 100% surveillance of a particular service, civil servants 
                                                
93 Even if secret monitoring was deemed legal in a particular circumstance, while video taping could be 
conducted in secret, filmage would need to be entered into evidence during a prosecution, revealing the video 
taping to the rest of the civil servants.  
94 As will be discussed below, much investigation services prefer to use a risk-based approach, sampling at 
random goods or financial transactions. Sampling frequences are determined by the risk of each population 
segment. See Albanese (2001) for more. As a simple hypothetical mathematical exercise, assume that 5% of a 
200 man customs agency take $50 in bribes per day (which corresponds with empirical estimates in a number of 
low income countries). The cost of searching each person (after the start up costs of the programme have been 
paid) include roughly five people working all day to conduct searches of all 200 officers. If they are paid $20 a 
day, then $100 a day are paid in “enforcement costs.” However, the $2 in time lost from the 200 men searched 
per day equals $400. This simple example shows how gains deriving froom reductions in corruption can be 
reduced by the increased costs imposed on the administration.  
95 Two issues arise with a “reasonable cause” standard. The first (and obvious) issue pertains to the extent to 
which government authorities can use data about groups of individuals to substantiate reasonable cause leading 
to the investigation of a particular individual. The compromise being applied (particularly in the United States) is 
a type of profiling, whereby individuals from more risky risky groups are randomly selected for further search – 
though even this system is not without its detractors (see Lever, 2005 for more). The second (and less obvious) 
issue concerns the rights employees – particularly employees of the state – should possess while at work. On the 
one hand, civil servants should (and clearly do) surrender rights over their own privacy in the interest of the 
public good. On the other hand, high levels of search and over-sight – without reasonable cause -- clearly 
represent invasions of privacy (as embodied in many national constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe) and 
causes civil servants to seek alternative employment without such high levels of surveillance. Clearly, if the 
particular rights of privacy being abrogated are even legislatively allowed to the surrendered,  the legality of 
oversight depends on the voluntary surrender of these rights by the civil servant. The use of coercion by the 
government in encouraging civil servants to accept extensive oversight represents an abridgement of these civil 
servants civil rights. See Bennett (1992) for a deeper discussion of the issues.  
96 Hear-say evidence is discounted (or considered inadmissible as evidence) by most judicial systems as being 
unreliable. The two main forms of evidence which would be used to establish reasonable cause for a large 
number of civil servants would be survey results and accusations made by third-parties not involved in a 
particular corruption offence. Survey results are clearly based on hear-say as a wide range of corruption 
perceptions surveys show collect data from individuals who have not used the services recently of a service 
which they are evaluating. Accusations made by third-parties are either based on opinions formed after talking 
with someone who paid a bribe or based on direct observation. As most corruption offences are carried out 
secretly, observations are relatively rare. The establishment of reasonable cause would clearly depend on each 
country’s jurisprudential tradition related to “reasonableness.”   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 30 
 
will solicit bribes outside the view of the video camera and use third-parties in order to escape 
detection. In the case of random investigation though, the probability of succeeding in the 
crime reduces the civil servants’ incentive to develop new method of collecting bribes or 
engaging in corrupt activities.
97  
 
Post-event random audits and auditing probes or tests are two “active” approachs to 
detecting corruption (in contrast to the “passive” methods previously discussed). In a post-
event random audit, the civil servant’s activities would be reviewed by an independent 
reviewer or auditor. Given the resources required to employ the reviewer, the person engages 
in performance audit – looking at “services events” where the civil servant both performed 
well and poorly.
98 Such audits occur ex-post (or after the event) in order to prevent the civil 
servant from changing his or her behaviour in light of the audit. In a test or probe of the 
department’s institutional integrity, more controversially, an official appointed by the head of 
department (or a more senior official) attempts to pay a bribe in exchange for a favor. The 
official may also stage a corrupt act to test whether the target observing the staged act reports 
the incident (as per his or her duty). Such tests are used to estimate the level and extent of 
bribe payments instead of used to convict particular individuals, and individual data are not 
revealed to the executive agency.  
 
Such probes or tests – when used with other techniques -- should be conducted for 
three reasons. First, they provide incontrovertible evidence related to the incidence of bribery 
and other types of corruption in an executive administration. Surveys of perceptions about 
corruption have problems with have been well enumerated and many executive agencies have 
objected to the ratings they have been given (Sampford et al., 2006). An independently 
conducted test of the incidence of bribery in an executive will certainly be deemed more 
reliable than an incidence established by polls of businessmen or households.
99 Second, a 
system of probes which seek to collect estimates of corruption instead of prosecute 
individuals infringes less on civil servants rights than many of the other types of surveillance 
(as daily searches for pocket money and continuous video surveillance comprise intrusive 
methods of detecting corruption). Such tests focus on the civil service system instead of 
particular individuals, thereby providing a reliable measure of the extent to which government 
policy contributes to corruption.
100 Third, such a system is cheap, easy to implement and 
effective – allowing the agency to reduce surveillance which interferes with civil servant 
                                                
97 A simple numerical example suffices to illustrate the argument. Suppose a civil servant collects $1,000 in 
bribes a month and type of surveillance is introduced which has 100% success rate. The civil servant will change 
methods into an inferiour method possibly resulting in $400 with no risk of further detection (the method will be 
inferiour, otherwise the civil servant would have used the alternative method in the first place). The government 
increases the use of costly and efficiency-reducing surveillance to cover alternative types of bribe collection. The 
government could introduce a surveillance technology with a 50% success rate, this in case the civil servant will 
earn an expected $500. While the less effective surveillance technology allows more bribes to be paid, it also 
allows the chance that briber takers will be detected.   
98 As performance audit represents a well-researched area of public sector management, I refer the reader to 
Pollitt (1999) for a review of the issues and techniques. Such performance audits should be done to the extent the 
person increases the social value of civil servant production by more than his or her salary.  
99 For example, if a survey of perceptions estimated that 20% of customs officials take bribes and only 5% are 
recorded as taking bribes in a probe, then the probe data would be authoritative – suggesting that the executive 
agency focuses on PR activities highlighting its anti-corruption work (as perceptions are negatively biased) .  
100 Clearly in cases where such tests find a high incidence of bribe solicition suggests government policy 
facilitates bribes (or acts negligently toward bribery). Such data could usefully by civil servants prosecuted for 
corruption offences in support of defences discussed previously. While the use of these data would reduce 
conviction rates, they would increase administrative power to discriminate between corruption offences 
encourages by the public sector management environment and corruption for which the individual civil servant is 
solely liable.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 31 
 
work. Because civil servants are not protected from corruption offences committed during the 
probe or test, this form of detection has fewer negative impacts on morale than the other 
forms of detection previously mentioned.  
 
In the administrative law of some countries, such tests or probes might be interpreted 
as entrapment.  Entrapment occurs when an individual is “induced or persuaded by law 
enforcement officers or their agents to commit a crime that he had no previous intent to 
commit.”
101  Entrapment is generally prohibited because entrapment involves government 
participation either directly in a crime or indirectly through inciting a crime. Managers in 
executive agencies who engage in entrapment may face stiff penalties (as defined in the 
administrative code) as well as possible liability for participating in the crime which the 
public official was attempted to entrapment the other party. These remedies have resulted in 
the categorical refusal of many government agency managers from considering managerial 
audits involving the types of probes discussed previously.  
 
However, public sector managers should rethink (after taking legal advice) the use of 
tests of institutional integrity for four reasons. First, entrapment does not occur when the 
government merely provides the opportunity for the person to commit a crime which he or she 
was ready and willing to engage in. Any legal test which provides an opportunity to engage in 
corruption (but uses no form of coercion to incite a crime) fails incitement. Second, the theory 
of entrapment relies on law enforcement agencies targeting private citizens (whose rights are 
protected as defined in law). In cases where a civil servant is involved, such a probe becomes 
subject to administrative law and the employment contract between the civil servant and the 
state. While the obligation of law enforcement does not create the positive obligation of the 
state to ensure that private citizens are not engaged in corruption, the state has the duty to 
ensure that its civil servants do not participate in corruption. Moreover, the department 
manager -- who potentially holds liability in corruption cases – has a responsibility to ensure 
it avoids liability for corruption and upholds its duty of care toward the rule of law. Such tests, 
therefore, represent an important defense against potential corruption allegations based on 
implicit consent, contributory negligence and other arguments which place liability on the 
government. Such probes represent managerial monitoring which is no more intrusive than 




Because the law is often a matter of interpretation, the executive agency manager can 
take several precautions to ensure he or she does not face liability for entrapment when using 
a test of institutional integrity (or at a minimum help ensure that the implementation of these 
probes is not overturned by administrative courts or the constitutional court. All of these 
                                                
101 I purposely take this definition from an online law dictionary to provide the reader with a resource to find 
more information. See http://www.lectlaw.com/def/e024.htm.  
102 In practice, the law in many developing countries is likely to still be unclear about the use of these probes or 
tests (namely the law does not specificially forbid probes of the type mentioned in this paper). In this case, the 
head of the executive agency can order such probing to be conducted on a trial basis. If no complaint is filled, 
then the order remains legal. If a complaint filed with the administrative court, the order may be rescinded but 
the managerial would not bear liability (as long as he or acted in good faith and in the government’s best 
interests). As data collected would not comprise evidence in trials against civil servants (and could even be 
declared statuatorally as inadmissible), tresspaass or other forms of harm would be difficult to prove. Should the 
executive manager wish to use the results of these tests more aggressive, he or she may use them to build risk 
profiles of various civil servants in his or her department. Given the already extensive use of psychological and 
other testing, the collection and use of these data should be not more problematic than the use of these other test 
scores. The value of such information would clearly exceed its cost and be more reliable than the results of 
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activities seek to ensure coercion is not used, civil servants are partners instead of targets of 
these probes, and probes are implemented and data used in a just manner.
103 All these 
activities do not require extra legislative reform.
104  
 
Figure 18: Administrative activities aimed at indemnifying government  
from liability for entrapment  
 
·  Signed forms of consent at start of employment. The civil servant can be informed that he or she 
will be under irregular tests for bribe seeking. Individuals refusing to sign the form can be given 
low-corruption-risk jobs.
105   
·  Probe as character testimony. The manager can use the results of such probes as evidence of good 
character. Using individual results during investigations for corruption (or even other offences 
where the person’s character is material to the outcome) could provide incentives to keep the 
system.  
·  Defense against respondeat superior. The manager can increasingly accept departmental liability 
(not personal liability) for corruption offences; recognizing that the additional obligation would 
entrain additional rights to conduct such probes (as a defense against complicity and contributory 
negligence).  
·  Design the probe such that the test for entrapment fails (such that the idea is from defendant, 
government provides opportunity instead of motivation, and can clearly establish ex-ante 
intent).
106  
·  Minimise harms of data use. Using probes only to collect data about corruption trends reduces or 
eliminates the harm experienced by individual civil servants, reducing incentives to find the 
decision to conduct probes as ultra vires.
107  
·  Make judgments which support the vague provisions of the national anti-corruption law. Many 
anti-corruption laws have phrases to the effect that a civil servant will take whatever measures 
they deem necessarily to prevent corruption and detect corruption when it occurs. Thus, decisions 
which set the precedent for such probes can be taken which directly identify the decision or decree 
as implementing the national anti-corruption law.  
                                                
103 As stated previously, national legislation can provide the manager with incentives to implement these types of 
probes – by creating a clearly defined test for administrative complicity and the establishment of rights to 
funding for anti-corruption work (as well as the obligation to pay damages in cases of departmental complicity 
with corruption offences).   
104 As discussed previously, regulations create distortions to both public and private sector activity. Therefore, 
regulations should seek, where possible, to implement programmes using (or reinterpreting) existing law instead 
of relying on costly legislative and/or regulatory change.  
105 As long as tests are discriminatorily used, the public sector manager need not worry about liability for 
discimination or violation of civil rights as precidents clearly exist in the form of drug testing or tests used to 
establish merit.  
106 Remember that a crime or civil offence requires mens rea (intention) and actus reus (action). Liability for 
entrapment revolves around whether mens rea would exist indepedently of the individual conducting the probe. 
Clearly a probe of customs bribery which involved an individual crossing a border (making no solicition for 
preferential treatment in exchange for a bribe) would not be entrapment; nor would the individual incite a crime 
if the person’s documentation was incomplete. See Allen et al. (1999) for a fuller exposition about entrapment.  
107 To help assure civil servants that the government will not renege on its promise not to use these data for 
prosecutions, the manager may remind staff that the burden of proof lies with the government to prove that 
entrapment did NOT occur…ensuring a reasonable level of protection for audited civil servants. At first glance, 
the government appears to be abetting a crime by failing to prosecute cases in which civil servants have solicted 
bribes (as prosecutors are legally bound to prosecute all people for infractions of the law). Namely, even though 
the agency may not bear criminal liability for participation in corruption, the agency may hold liability for failing 
to prosecute a crime. Many criminal law traditions, though, allow the government to forgo prosecution and/or the 
collection of data (such as the individual identity of each civil servant engaged in solicitation) in cases where 
these activites prove contrary to the government’s over-riding interests. Government administrators can rely 
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Issues in International Asset Recovery and International Law 
 
  As noted previous, particularly the UN Convention Against Corruption seeks for the 
recovery of assets which have been financed from corruption which are located in foreign 
countries.
108 On the one hand, in most legal traditions, the law clearly requires that illegally 
obtained funds be restituted to their rightful owner. On the other hand, in an international 
context, such claw-back bumps up against international sovereignty and possibly economic 
efficiency.
109 Namely, can banks in London trust a decision made by a Czech court and will 
return of Czech funds discourage investment in the City?
110  
 
  The asset recovery provision as embodied in the UN Convention is likely to stumble 
on a number of problems.
111 First, many assets involved in corruption are laundered, 
introducing a number of intermediary parties. Each of these intermediary parties obtains 
(often legally) a part of the proceeds of the originally corrupt transactions – and the “washed” 
funds themselves may be possessed legally by the person engaged in corruption. Thus 
recovering these funds would deprive a number of innocent parties of money which they 
obtained legally. The part of the original proceeds which are “washed” are difficult to restitute 
because proving they belong to the original owner would be difficult.
112 Second, several 
countries have bank secrecy laws, making recovery of assets less likely. As asset recovery 
becomes more effective in OECD countries, funds will increasingly shift to these tax havens. 
Third, recovery of assets from foreign countries is likely to be an expensive process. For 
example, if a car is bought with funds embezzled from a participating state, the car must be 
seized, sold and then funds wired to the counterpart country. 
 
  The more important problem facing the UN Convention relates to the acceptance and 
execution of decisions taken by foreign courts. Developing countries (and in particular 
Central and Eastern European countries) have several options -- as depicted in Figure 19 – in 
the way they handle foreign rulings on corruption related to the restitution of funds from 
corruption. At one end of the spectrum, courts may give foreign jurisdiction – enforcing the 
                                                
108 The UN Convention while a useful first start at fighting corruption global, suffers from a number of serious 
problems. In this paper, I address mainly its provisions for asset seizure (as the real innovation of this 
Convention). See Michael (2004) for an analysis and critique of the Convention and Webb (2005) for a broader 
overview.  
109 Stessens (2005) covers many of these issues in a money laundering context. Irregardless of the legality of 
claw-back, potential claims on funds decreases the security of property rights over these funds; decreasing the 
predictability of investment. For example, if B steals funds from A and subsequently pays C, then C (as the 
“holder in due course”) has no remedies when these funds are reclaimed by A. The extent to which corruption 
represents a “real defense” in practice in the national law of UN signatory countries remains to be seen. From 
bank C’s point of view, the dishonour of this credit represents a business risk (and increases B’s certainly he can 
access these funds – assuming he is not in prison).  
110 While not addressed in this paper, the UN Convention (and OECD Convention) raise the issue of 
investigatory jurisdiction. Dugan and Lechtman (1997) cite evidence showing – quite terrifyingly – that the US 
Central Intelligence Agency has been involved with the collection of intelligence about non-US citizens bribing 
non-US foreign officials.  
111 See Kilchling (2001) for more on asset recovery. Given the costs o f investigation and seizure, only relatively 
large bribes should be (and are) attempted to be reclaimed.  
112 In practice, this problem might be relatively easy to overcome. Intermediaries can either take insurance 
protecting them from depossession or in the interests of equity, the government can provide insurance -- 
particulary as government officials wiil also bear some liability for the original corruption offence which gave 
rise to the repossession of the funds and as the provision of such insurance would help insulate the government 
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decision of foreign courts or requests from foreign governments.
113 The court receives a 
request for the confiscation of the convicted individual’s assets and instructs the bank holding 
the proceeds of corruption to debit the account holder who has been convicted in a foreign 
jurisdiction. These funds are wired to a pre-nominated account held by the requesting 
government. Translated judgment requires the court in the country where the funds are held to 
arrive at a similar judgment – in the legal tradition and using the judicial procedures – as the 
requesting country’s court. Such a procedure in some ways requires double jeopardy – trying 
the same individual twice for the same crime, albeit in a different jurisdiction.
114  
 
Figure 19: Foreign Translation of Judgments in International Corruption Cases 
 
  Description  Conditions for 
jurisdiction 
Pros  Cons 
Foreign 
Jurisdiction 
National courts respect 




judicial system is 
similar to counterpart 
countries system. 
High counterpart 
judicial quality.  
1. Reduces the 
transactions costs of 
dealing with 
corruption. 
2. Deals quickly and 
effectively with 
corruption. 
1. Deals with crime 
that isn’t that 






foreign courts or 
administrative body 
must reach similar 
conclusion as foreign 
power, “translating” 
the decision.  
Interacting states 
have different court 
systems; one or both 
countries have low 
judicial quality.  
1. Ties claims by 
foreign courts to 
domestic judicial 
system 
2. Can help protect 
individual rights.
115  
1. Expense  
2. Possible 
unavailability of 







participates in foreign 
trial, seeing evidence 
and ensuring the 
quality of the 
judgment.  
Low transactions cost 




prosecutions.   
Internalises the cross-
border aspect of the 
case; helps make the 
trial like a domestic 
trial.  









refuse to consider 
claims by foreign 
powers 
country relies heavy 






and expense of 
dealing with claims 
by foreign countries 
Country will 
probably not receive 
legal and other types 
of assistance in 
return.  
 
  In a joint judgment, officials from the country where the bank is located attend the trial 
and offer evidence (if required). As participants in the trial, they can informally advice the 
judge and counsel to ensure procedures are followed which are deemed legal in both 
countries. Finally, in a no jurisdiction system, the court generally (as a matter of policy) 
                                                
113 The exact working procedure used my vary, depending on the country. Most Eastern European countries 
(particular former Soviet countries) have a tradition of channeling relations with foreign countries through either 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or through a foreign relations department in the ministry of justice. Increasingly 
(thanks to the internet), Ministries of Justice are dealing with each other directly (though the extradition of funds 
still remains a political as well as technocratic decision).  
114 In practice, such a procedure may be conducted administratively. The judge in the country where the funds 
are located may examine the proceedings from the foreign trial . He or she may then decide, based on his or her 
country’s legal tradition and rules of evidence, whether the verdict can be applied in the foreign jurisdiction and 
whether the funds held by that country’s bank can be tied beyond a reasonable doubt especially to corruption.  
115 Privacy and the security of property have always been viewed as effective measures against state infrigement 
of civil liberties and individuals have often placed assets abroad when their government’s policies have 
agressively abridged civil liberties.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 35 
 
refuses foreign country requests for the restitution of funds. By refusing as a matter of policy 
(instead of on a case by case basis), judicial co-operation becomes a political issue instead of 
a technocratic issue. Clearly the extent of translation should correspond with the 
reliability of the requesting government’s judicial and court system and the cost of 
executing foreign judgments.  
 
When assets are recovered and remitted to the requesting country, funds can be 
remitted to a number of possible parties. As discussed previously, damages from judgments 
should recover the funds obtained from corruption, compensate parties harmed by corruption 
and serve to provide incentives to civil servants to continue fighting corruption. Figure 20 
shows the possible beneficiaries of international asset recovery as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages to allocating the proceeds obtained to each party. Naturally, the allocation of 
these funds will maximize efficiency as well as equity – serving the interests of justice (to 
the extent possible) and providing incentives to continue fighting corruption.
116  
 
Figure 20: Restitution of Funds Tied to Corruption  
 
Beneficiary  Description  Pros  Cons 
Law Enforcement 
Agency 
The agency which 
detected the infraction 
obtains part or all of the 
damages.   
1. Ties pay to 
performance 
2. Funds additional anti-
corruption work.  
3. Relies of justice to 
future potential 
corruption victims.  
1. Creates incentives to 
trap innocent persons.  
2. Pays bureaucrats 
instead of victims 
3. Potentially 
undemocratic 
Law suit (direct harm)  Individuals directly 
harmed (coerced to pay 
bribes, lose business) are 
compensated.  
1. Ties claims to private 
harms  
2. Encourages victims 
activism against 
corruption 
1. Victims often to do 
step forward 
2. Costly   




harmed by corruption 
(longer waiting times, 
lack of access to public 
services, etc.) are 
compensated.  
1. Dissuades corruption 
because of potentially 
large claims. 
2. Ties claim to social 
harm (which is the 






3. Makes society more 
litigious  
Treasury  Proceeds from corruption 
put in general government 
budget.  
Proceeds from a public 
harm used to generate 
public goods.  
Generally budgets are 
weak or potentially prone 
to corruption! 
 
                                                
116 A further discussion of the allocation of the restituted proceeds from corruption would make this paper even 
longer. The proceeds should be allocated to each party based on their marginal welfare. Namely, victims of 
corruption will derive some benefit from compensation. However, such a benefit must be traded off against the 
benefit future potential victims of corruption enjoy through more anti-corruption work. The benefit of all these 
parties must furthermore be traded-off against the benefit individuals may experience by the funding of other 
social goods and services. If damages are awarded which cover all harms (and if the convict have enough money 
to pay all the damages awarded), then funds can be easily allocated such that social social welfare is maximised. 
If the convict does not have enough money, then funds should be allocated justly (as decided by the concept of 
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Enforcing the OECD Convention and International Law 
 
The OECD Convention criminalizes the payment of bribes by businessmen from 
OECD member countries to foreign officials anywhere in the world.
117 At the heart of the 
OECD Convention is the issue of jurisdiction (and the application of the laws of that 
jurisdiction) because the businessman from an OECD member country who bribes a foreign 
official in a non-OECD country commits corruption offenses in two countries.
118 A related 
question concerns the level (and partition of damages) which provides optimal incentives – 
maximisng incentives for governments to prosecute corruption offences while simultaneous 
minimizing incentives for companies to engage in corruption.  
 
Under what jurisdiction should the offence be tried?
119 In some cases, the 
jurisdictional issue can be resolved relatively simply; a German paying a bribe in Zimbabwe 
should be tried in Germany. In some cases, jurisdiction is less clear; a Mexican national 
attempting to bribe an American through intermediary parties while remaining physically in 
Mexico.
120 In other cases, the jurisdictional issue is extremely complex. For example, a case 
may involve the bribing of officials in Moldova by Turkish citizens using false certificates of 
origin for American-made cars which are destined to be sold in the Ukraine.
121 Who should 
have jurisdiction, Moldova (where the offence occurred), Turkey (which is a signatory to the 
OECD Convention) or Ukraine (where the majority of the harm occurs).
122  
 
                                                
117 For an authoritative treatment of the issues surrounding the OECD Convention, see Pieth et al. (2007).  
118 Schroth (2002) includes a detailed discussion of juridiction and forum selection, both for violations of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and under the OECD Convention. Rather than repeat the arguments, I attempt to 
use implications of Schroth’s analysis for prescriptive analysis. Dugan and Lechtman (1997) provide several 
examples where the US has shown a large amount of judicial activism in prosecuting corruption cases involving 
non-US citizens, as US courts have ruled that “renting or buying real property in the United States may amount 
to sufficient minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction over the foreign person” (381). Elliott (1997) provides an 
overview of many of the issues related to the fight against corruption across international borders.  
119 The jurisdictional issue arises both from a legal and a practical point of view. According to the OECD 
Convention article 4 "Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for offences committed 
abroad shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery 
of a foreign public official, according to the same principles." See the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. OECD/DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16~IN(A1L8 Dec. 
1997). 37 ILM 1(1998).  
120 Both countries are signatory to the OECD Convention. The problem arises from the differences in judicial 
quality between the countries which may decrease the relevance of jurisdictional decision based on the 
application of the principles of territoriality, nationality, effects, and universality.  Interestingly, the theory of 
jurisdiction as taught in international law rarely touches about forum selection based on judicial quality (though 
in practice the choice of forum often depends on the perceived reliability of the courts in a particular country)!  
121 At the time of writing, Moldova and Ukraine had a free trade zone, so American cars which are redesigned as 
produced in Moldova would receive preferential customs duties. The USA and Turkey are parties to the OECD 
Convention whereas Ukraine and Moldova are not parties to the convention. 
122 Figure 21 includes trial in an American court because the US judiciary has been particularly active (relative to 
other countries) in hearing cases which have extra-territorial effects (see Small, 1987 for more).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 37 
 
Figure 21: Forum Selection for International Corruption Cases 
 




OECD Convention broken in 
Turkey.  
Upholds trial by peers 
and makes legal system 
bear cost of own 
citizens 
Potential weakness in court system 
by international standards; 
expensive to send; possibly 
different standards related to 
admissibility of evidence and 





justification (Moldova was site 
of crime). Evidence against 
civil servants also probably 
relevant in trial against 
Turkish businessmen.  
Ties offense and trail of 
offense to place where 
crime committed  
Potential weakness in court system 
by international standards 
Ukraine 
court 
Effects-doctrine  Upholds jurisdiction 
based on effects 





likelihood of fair trial; 
establishment of precedents 
for use in other cases.  
Precedent of US courts 
litigating on foreign 
cases 
Only peripherally tied to case 
 
The solution to the jurisdictional issue involves a three-stage process. In the first 
stage, the country with the highest judicial quality should sit the case, subject to the agreement 
of all the states involved (the USA in the example given in Figure 21). In the second stage, the 
actual jurisdiction (which country’s laws should be used during the trial) should determined 
by the judge in the court chosen for the case (the US judge would consider Moldova, 
Ukrainian, Turkish and US jurisdiction).
123 Once jurisdiction has been established, the trial 
proceeds and a verdict is reached. In the third-stage, the host country charges the country of 
jurisdiction for costs of the trial.
124 
 
   Second, what should be the liability for company officials and representatives in the 
bribing of foreign officials in international business transactions? Clearly criminal 
responsibility is too strict (given the relatively few convictions to date under the OECD 
Convention). In cases where a company’s representative can be shown to have engaged in a 
corruption offense such that the company holds no liability (namely the company’s implied 
and explicit wishes and outside of work conditions), the individual would face personal 
criminal liability. However, in cases where the company representative may have been acting 
in the company’s interests and on the company’s orders, the company must bear partial or 
complete liability for the corruption offense.  
 
In many legal traditions, liability passes through the company to the directors or senior 
management who act on the company’s behalf. Such a tradition prevents legal action against 
corruption when using a criminal standard of proof.
125 Instead, a weaker provision should be 
                                                
123 Courts are becoming increasingly comfortable trying cases according to the laws of foreign countries, 
particularly as many countries recognise choice of jurisdictions clauses in commercial contracts. The application 
of foreign jurisdiction has been hampered by the lack of legal expertise in foreign law in most countries.    
124 By charging the state in whose jurisdiction the trial should have been held (if that state had a reliable court 
system), this tax serves to encourage these states to focus resources on developing their own judicial systems (in 
order to avoid the costs of more expensive trials in foreign countries). If the defendent’s proceeds from 
corruption are located in a bank in the host country, the host county may deduct legal fees from before restituting 
the remainder (as described in the discusson of the UN Convention previously).  
125 See Beale and Safwat (2004) for an expanded discussion about corporate criminal liability for corruption 
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added to the Convention that for legal persons (corporations, NGOs and state agencies who 
are not acting under jure imperii), the burden of proof should be reversed in corruption cases 
involving corporations.
126 Namely, when corporation are accused of engaging in corruption, 
they have the burden to show that they had been involved in corruption.
127 As described 
previously in the decision of a government department’s burden of proof, such a burden can 
be justified by the relatively higher duty of care incumbent on companies (in contrast with 
individuals), the lower cost of establishing innocence (given the large amount of reporting 
corporations conduct) and the burden of guilt (corporations are better able to cope with the 
trial and pay damages than individuals).
128 Thus, two tests would be required -- establishing 
respondeat superior (corporate liability for the corruption of its representative) and failure to 
disprove the allegation. Clearly, a civil standard of proof should be required, making 




Two Tests for Corporate Liability under the OECD Convention 
 
1. Could company management have forseen that an authorized company representative could 
be placed in a situation where that representative would have an incentive to use personal or 
company funds in a corrupt transaction with a foreign government official in helping to 
increase the company’s revenues?  
 
2. Is the company able to produce records and other documents which add plausible 
deniability to charges of corruption by its representatives?   
  
 
Under a civil law remedies for corporate corruption, the maximum penalty incurred by 
companies under this provision would be a flat-rate fine, payable in the company’s country of 
                                                
126 Submission of a complaint about a company’s bribing of government officials by third parties would not 
diminish the liability of the civil servant and the sanctions imposed on him or her (which is discussed in previous 
sections of this paper). The use of this procedure would often occur when the person lodging the complaint does 
not have evidence pertaining to a parrticular corrupt transaction between a specific civil servant and the 
company. To the extent that charges lead to convictions under the lighter standard of proof, a trail of civil 
servants with whom the company interacted would probably exist in the company files, allowing corruption 
investigation service to form judgements about the riskiness of these civil servants.  
127 The reversal of the burden of proof is not a new concept (in the UK, civil servants have the onus of proof in 
cases of alleged corruption). The provision, as an amendment to the OECD Convention or the Council of Europe 
Civil Convention against Corruption, can be ratified in national parliaments as an amendment either to the anti-
corruption law or to the companies law. From an enforcement point of view, amendment of the Company Act 
would be preferrable as the company regulatory body has greater enforcement and supervision power than the 
Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Interior.  
128 Companies, unlike individials, as required by law and the practicalities of business, produce a large amount of 
documentation during the course of business. Thus the cost of proving that a company official did not engage in 
corruption is much less than the cost for a private person. Moreover, the large amount regulation imposed of 
corporations demonstrates that companies are held to a more stringent concept of the duty of care than that 
applied to individuals. In some countries, the regulatory burden has become excessive; and a regulatory regime 
which relies on civil suits against corporations (instead of government enforcement of costly reporting and 
auditing requirements) can fight corruption more effective and increase economic performance/efficiency.  
129 Under such a burden, a regulator would need to be convinced that the company more likely paid a bribe than 
did not (to paraphrase Lord Denning). Thus (at the risk of being repetitive), under this provision, if the company 
had a 51% probability of paying the bribe, the company would pay damages. Naturally, the penalty would be 
much less than that incurred under the Convention where the company must be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt to have paid the bribe.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 39 
 
registration (or headquarters) for violations.
130 Such a “negligence fine” (as the fine punishes 
for failing to prove innocence instead of definitively punishes for corruption) is likely to 
reduce the profitable level of bribe payment and increase the optimal level of internal 
monitoring and prevention. Much experience suggests that the imposition of fines can lead to 
socially desired corporate behaviours much more readily than criminalisation.
131    
 
The optimal fine level depends on the average bribe being paid by all companies in a 
particular jurisdiction. Figure 22a shows the proportion of firms who pay bribes and the 
amounts they pay; distributed according to some statistical distribution.
132 In this Figure, b 
represents the average bribe amount, paid by the largest proportion of firms. Naturally, b also 
represents the optimal negligence tax, as a statistical estimate of the bribes any one firm is 
probably paying and the tax level which recoups the overall level of bribes paid to civil 
servants. A firm with a bribe level of b1 pays a higher amount in negligence taxes than it pays 
in bribes, making bribe paying an even more expensive activity.
133 A firm paying b2 in bribes 
will pay less in the negligence tax than in bribes, though the tax and bribe value will certainly 
reduce overall profits.  
 




0 b1 b b2
 
 
The effect the negligence tax will have on companies will depend on how companies 
respond to the tax.
134  Companies can either reduce the amount of bribes they pay or increase 
                                                
130 Schroter (2002) notes a number of cases in which companies have paid fines as plea bargains in corruption 
cases (involving International Harvester Co. and Goodyear International Corp.). A fixed fine would reduce the 
cost of such plea bargaining (as a fine represents a standardised plea bargain). The interested reader can consult 
Wells (2005) as a concise treatment of the issues revolving around corporate responsibility for corruption.  
131 According to Schroth (2002), the US legal tradition has increasingly tried to encourage companies to comply 
with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act using economic incentives.  He cites the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants Statement on Auditing Standards (No. 1, sec.320.28) and the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act releases (No. 34-13185 and 34-15772) in support of this argument. Hatzis (2002) describes the 
logic behind efficient penalties.  
132 The distribution depicted in Figures 22 roughly represents a beta distribution, such that many of the firms 
center around a bribe payment of zero. The Figure could have depicted a normal distribution truncated at zero, as 
negative bribe payments (or extra expenses undertaken by companies to avoid paying bribes) are both difficult to 
conceive in the real world.    
133 Such a fine takes into account that impossibility of estimating a particular person’s bribe payments. While 
individual bribes are difficult to measure, overall levels of bribery – and confidental individual estimates – can 
be obtained through surveys.  Thus the fining of innocent parties (which do not pay bribes), the failure to impose 
fines on bribe payers and under-fining as well as over-fining represent regulatory errors. As with all regulation, 
the magnitude of these errors is set as a level which is acceptable to the parliamentarians and staff of executive 
agencies designing the regulation.  
134 A formal model of the problem would make this paper unreadable to many of the policymakers this paper 
targets. As a partial formalisation for economist readers, c = a +ab + bb such that compliance costs are partly QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 40 
 
spending on compliance, monitoring and activities which either help show that company 
officials have not been engaged in corruption or help to hide corruption. As shown in Figure 
22b, a company with a bribe level of b1 may pay c of extra supervision – or hiding -- costs 
(which will affect the probability of the company paying an additional b in negligence taxes). 
These costs reduce the likelihood the company is caught paying bribes (though the company 
still pays bribes). In this case, c is less than b; suggesting that the company should undertake 
extra supervision. The company can also reduce its bribe level which also reduces the 
likelihood of paying a bribe tax. In the example shown in Figure 22b, the bribe rate may fall 
to b2 – because civil servants accept the argument that companies categorically refuse to bribe 
due to the tax. If (b1-b2) is greater than b, (namely if the reduction in bribe payments is 
greater than the fine the money must pay if found not in compliance), then the company saves 
money.  
 
Figure 22b: Trading-Off Bribery, Fines and Compliance Costs 
proportion of 
firms




In practice, a company will trade off “proving costs” (or the increased costs of 
reducing bribery and/or covering it up) with the expected cost of paying a negligence tax. 
Clearly, many companies in Figure 22b will not pay bribes, but be unable to prove (to a civil 
law standard) their innocence. Such Type II error (or the regulatory error of fining parties who 
are innocent of corruption though guilty of failing to keep enough documentation to prove 
their innocence) should decrease as a company increases is monitoring effort (and costs).
135  
However, increased monitoring costs are also expected to help companies cover up instances 
of bribery by developing more complicated accounting vehicles, extending the number of 
agents in a transaction, and so forth. These expenses help increase the negligence tax’s Type I 
error (or the probability that companies which are guilty of corruption will be found 
innocent).  
                                                                                                                                                   
fixes, increase at a rate a with negligence taxes. b or the effect of bribes actually paid will be positive or 
negative, depending on whether compliance costs it is more profitable for compliance to complement or 
substitute for bribery. The level of bribes increases by some rate d with the probability of incurring the fine q and 
the fine b such that b = dqb +  gc; where g may positive or negative depending on whether bribes and compliance 
costs are complements or substitutes. Naturally, the firms profits are p = p(b)*Q(b) – (b +c), such that the price 
of goods (p) and the quantity sold (Q) are functions of bribes paid – and revenues may fall or rise depending on 
the effects bribes have on sales. The complementarity of compliance costs and bribery depends on the effect 
bribe payments have on revenues. Figure 24 presents qualitatively the complementarity of compliance costs and 
bribery as a function of the profitability of bribery.   
135 Using terminology imported from statistics, regulatory errors are sometimes refered to as Type I and Type II 
errors. Type I error refers to cases where innocent individuals or companies are wrongly convicted under the 
regulation whereas Type II error describes the extext to which guilty parties are found innocent under a 
regulation. .  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 41 
 
 
An optimal level of investment in such proving costs (or monitoring effort) will 
emerge which both maximizes the chances that innocent and guilty companies are acquitted. 
Figure 22c plots the effects of Type I and Type II errors on the value of increasing activities 
aimed at detecting (and possibly hiding) corruption. As shown by the upward sloping line, the 
value of investing in compliance and proving for guilty firms increases because of the 
increased likelihood the regulator will make Type I errors (namely find guilty firms 
innocent).
136 The downward sloping line represents the economic drag these expenses cause 
on innocent companies (as they are truly innocent, these expenses represent a dead-weight 
loss on them and society). However, if such a fine where included in the OECD Convention, 
these expenses would be necessary to help ensure the firm is not found guilty of bribery 
offenses under the lighter civil standard of proof. For both innocent and guilty companies, the 
effect of such a regime on companies will decrease overall profits (and thus economic 
growth). If p represents the firm’s profits, b represents bribes paid, t represents the negligence 
tax, and c represents the additional costs of compliance (with p and Q representing the normal 
price and quantity of goods sold as revenue and C represents other costs of business such as 
wages and capital expenditures), then clearly the firms profits will be p = p*Q – C- (b+tc).
137  
 
Figure 22c: Trading Off Hiding versus Compliance Behaviour
Type II Error Effect
(charged guilty even though innocent)
monitoring effort/costs
Type I Error Effect





The extent to which a negligence tax (and thus the payment of extra compliance costs) 
reduces bribery depends on the relative profitability of bribery. Figure 23 shows the marginal 
benefits of paying a bribe compared with the marginal benefits of investing in monitoring 
which helps ensure the firm does not pay a bribery tax – given the fixed poll of resources 
available to the firm (which is plotted on the x-axis).
138 In this simple example, any shift in the 
                                                
136 Because both guilty and innocent firms will increase their expense on record keeping, supervision and 
accounting, the level of such expenses can not act as a sorting mechanism (which would help regulators detect 
guilty companies). In the language of game theory, a pooling strategy is the Nash equilibrium in this Bayesian 
two-stage game -- where firms select which type (guilt or innocent) they will be and then send a signal to 
regulators in the form of expenditure on monitoring.  Figure 22c represents such a pooling equilibrium as an 
equilibrium level of investment in these proving costs which are the same between guilty and innocent firms.  
137 Figure 22c provides the basic illustration of the relationship between monitoring value and monitoring effort. 
Clearly factors which increase the level of Type I error (such as a skilled inspector leaving the agency) would 
lead to more lower-valued monitoring (covering up) effort. An increase in Type II error (due to an anti-
corruption crusade) would result in more monitoring and covering-up costs – which makes bribery more difficult 
in general.  
138 As discussed in the third section of this paper, the amount of resources available for the payment of bribes 
and taxes is limited to the rents or profits generated by the firm. As intimated above, a tax which reduces the 
amount of rents available to pay bribes represents a second-best solution to corruption (with the first-best 
solution consisting of removing the economic distortion or regulation leading to the creation of these rents in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 42 
 
marginal benefit of investing in compliance will necessarily result in a reduction in the 
amount of bribes paid because resources are finite. This argument presupposes that the firm 
can not reduce its capital expenditure or staff salaries in order to find finds to maintain the 
current level of bribery. If civil servants refuse to accept a lower level of bribe payments, then 
the firm must free up resources from other areas of activity, resulting in a substitution effect 
between bribes and compliance costs. In Figure 23, such a substitution effect would be 
illustrated by an outward shift in the marginal benefits of paying a bribe (the downward 
sloping line in the figure). Conversely, if civil servants are more tolerant of reductions in bribe 
levels (or if the negligence taxes previously discussed reduce the funds available to pay 
bribes), the effect would be to shift out the upward sloping curve.  
 
available resources
marginal benefit of 
paying a bribe




Figure 23: The Allocation of Bribes and Compliance Costs
 
 
The effects of the negligence tax (as intimated by Figure 23) depends on the 
profitability of bribery, the ability of the company to pay bribes, and the extent to which civil 
servants are willing to change their demand for bribes as the negligence tax on bribe suppliers 
increases. Figure 24 summarises the possible effects of such a negligence tax – showing the 
conditions under which such a tax imposes an extra burden on companies, crowds out bribe, 
reduces the payment of bribes and had no effect on bribery. As shown in the Figure, the effect 
of the tax depends on the ability of firms to pay bribes and the elasticity of bribe seeking 
(which describes the proportional change in bribe seeking for changes in the negligence tax). 
The Figure also shows the likely effects on economic activity. Such a negligence tax is likely 
to be most effective when civil servants are not too rapacious and few extra company 
resources are available to pay bribes. Conversely, when other government policy makes a 
large amount of economic rents available to companies and when civil servants aggressively 










                                                                                                                                                   
cases where such regulations do not serve a strong social objective, such as restricting the flow of illegal 
weapons).   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 43 
 
Figure 24: Possible Effects of a Negligence Tax 
 











Negligence tax forced 
companies to pay on top of 
bribes paid.  





es for bribes 
Negligence tax encourages firms 
to get tough on paying bribes. 
Acts to convince civil servants 
that no money left for bribes.  
Low  Medium  Ambiguous, 
depends on 
incidence of tax.  
Reduces 
bribe burden 
Tax encourages companies to 
self-monitor. Acts as credible 
deterrent for bribe seeking civil 
servants.  
Low  High  increases 
economic 
activity 
No effect  Companies do not change 
behaviour, treating the tax as an 
insurable risk.
139  







While such a negligence tax seems (in most cases) to harm economic activity, the 
social benefits could well exceed the social costs. The money from these taxes could be used 
to fund anti-corruption work conducted by various government agencies (and to pay fines 
from administrative suits filed against the department for corruption offenses).
140 Clearly, as 
previously discussed, the closer the negligence tax can be tied to the government’s anti-
corruption work (instead of being deposited in the national Treasury), the more corruption-
reducing impact such a tax is likely to have. As shown in Figure 25, the tax provides weak 
incentives for companies to self-enforce (as shown by the bottom upward sloping line). Funds 
can also be used to finance the work of internal security departments and the anti-corruption 
agency (or its equivalent in the country concerned). The proceeds can also be used to finance 
the qui tam rewards which were previous discussed (providing high-powered incentives for 
enforcing the anti-corruption law). The sum of all these effects is shown in Figure 25 as the 
highest line in the graph. As an aside, such a scheme could also compensate victims of 
corruption because the government department could collect fines on the behalf of these 
victims – as portrayed in Figure 13.
141  
                                                
139 Financial institutions are increasingly developing insurance products based on regulatory outcomes (such as 
director’s liability insurance which pays even in the case the director bears full legal liability). If firms can insure 
against this risk (which is partly a function of the company’s behaviour and partly attributable to external 
factors), then the compliance costs c represented in Figure 22 would depict an insurance premium. As this paper 
focuses on developing countries (whose insurance offerings are much less developed than in the developed 
economies), such insurance is unlikely to affect the analysis presented in this paper in the short-run.    
140 Taxes can be assessed on OECD multinational enterprises operating in developing countries either by the 
foreign government directly or by the government of the OECD member country where the enterprise is 
headquartered. In the former case, a subsidiary of the enterprise must be registered as a company/corporation in 
the developing country (and subject to its regulatory regime). In the latter case, the funds can either be used by 
the OECD government to fund addition investigation activities or sent as foreign aid to the law enforcement 
agency of the country where the developing country where the violation occured leading to the incidence of the 
tax.   
141 Consider the case where a representative of Cheatem Plc pays bribes to a customs officer of the Elbonian 
Federation (as a fictitious example). Elbonian victims could sue the customs department and the department in 






extra incentives under qui-tam
total anti-corruption effort
incentives for self-monitoring 
Note: This graph does not show the two harms concomitant with increased anti-corruption work. First, the 
“negligence fine” would distort private markets as well as public sector activity. Second, the work might focus on 
efficiency increasing speed payments which help facilitate commerce, thereby lowering welfare. 
Figure 25: Effects of an Amendment to the OECD Convention 
 
Putting it All Together: Drafting Agency Anti-Corruption Regulations and Changing 
National Legislation 
 
All of the issues presented in this paper can be brought together in an executive 
agency’s regulations which implement the national anti-corruption law (and thus the CoE, UN 
and OECD international conventions against corruption). National legislation should be 
general (abstract) enough such that each executive agency can implement the principles 
embodied in such legislation without being constrained by specific requirements which are 
not relevant for the executing agency. However, national legislation should be specific 




Making national anti-corruption legislation more specific involves costs and benefits 
for the executive agencies responsible for implementing such legislation. Figure 26 shows the 
increasing marginal value of making national anti-corruption legislation more specific as a 
guiding effect. To some extent, laws are standardized contracts which are applicable across all 
executive departments; embodying the learning and political agreements which each agency is 
spared from having to negotiate separately. The Figure also shows the decreasing marginal 
value of such clarity as a constraining effect – as specific national legislation constrains 
executive agencies’ options for selecting theories of anti-corruption (and the corresponding 
methods of implementation) which seem appropriate to that agency’s management.  As shown 
in the figure, the point at which the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits for increased 
specificity and relevance for national anti-corruption legislation indicates an optimum (S* in 
                                                                                                                                                   
the grounds that the government can undertake the legal action more cheaply and quickly than a private legal 
partnership).  
142 Michael (2004) presents a methodology for measuring the specificity and relevance of articles contained in 
the international anti-corruption conventions (and in national legislation) as a way of quantifying the abstractness 
of these legal instruments. The assessment showed that all the conventions, and particularly the UN Convention, 
was excessively abstract – failing to provide sufficient guidance to signatory states on implementing the broad 
principles contained in these conventions.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 45 
 
the graph).
143 As discussed in the first section of this paper, over time a jurisprudential 
tradition develops (as many executive choose similar anti-corruption activities and 
philosophies). The adoption of these similar activities represents an upward shift in the 
constraining effect of national legislation (resulting in a higher value of national legislation in 
fighting corruption). Yet, the adoption of approaches (particularly ineffective approaches have 
been adopted in countries based on donor organisation advice) results in increased relevance 
which decreases the value of anti-corruption legislation.
144   
  
specificity/relevance of anti-corruption laws









In many cases, national legislation should over time be amended to facilitate the 
implementation of the anti-corruption conventions discussed in this paper. Figure 27 
summarises the various activities described in this paper and provides the outline for 
executive level regulation aimed at fighting corruption. The figure also discusses changes 
which may eventually occur to national legislation (which was discussed in the first part of 
this paper) as existing practice translates over time into legislation. Figure 27 shows four 
panels which discuss liability for anti-corruption offences, methods of finance and 
indemnification for corruption related harms, jurisdiction for various corruption-related 




                                                
143 While the level of specificity and relevance depicted in Figure 26 represents an optimum, such a level may 
not represent an equilibrium level – as the level of specificty and relevance emboddied in national legislation is 
based on parliamentary politics and not technocratic considerations. See Michael (2007) for more.  
144 Such an effect may explain the very general nature of the UN and OECD conventions which seek to prevent 
the imposition of guiding principles which may be ineffective for a particular signatory state.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS150           Page 46 
 
Figure 27a: Legislation and Regulation Establishing Corruption Liability 
 
Provision  Provisions in National Law  Provisions in Departmental Regulation  Support for international conventions 
Corruption 
contract test  
 
* Defines contract test broadly 
* Broad enough to allow departmental 
amendments 
* Describes with detailed examples 
* Provides exemptions as necessary  




* covers test for assigning liability to government 
official and assigning to businessperson 
* defines situations where case handed for 
criminal investigation and prosecution. 
* describes specific things that happen in order to 
assign liability 
* presents departmental procedures used to hand 
over case for criminal investigation.   
* Concretises the criminalisation broadly and 
abstractly urged in conventions 






* Establishes respondeat superiour  
* Presents theory of liability and defenses.  
* Presents broad guidelines for managers to 
choose activities in order to avoid liability  
* covers types of management  
* Specific actions in context which establish 
liability 
* Covers specific types of activities to avoid or 
reduce liability 
Helps align criminal responsibility with 
liability (by extending number of potential 







* Establishes clear separation of government and 
personal liability 
* Establishes criteria for each type of liability 
* Presents approach to avoid liability  
* Presents broadly the government’s duty of care  
* Sets civil burden of proof and fines as remedies 
* covers specific conditions whereby department is 
complicit or negligent  
* sets fine levels based on harm  
* sets criteria for harms  
* establishes procedures for determining 
complicity and indemnifying harmed parties.  
Addresses important short-comings in 
international conventions.  
Helps tie indemnity to liability (criminal 
conventions stubbornly focus on individual 









* Legalises dismissal from position in ministry (or 
executive agency) when affiliated parties engaged 
in corruption to help politician win election.  
* Acts principle enshrined in national law.  
* Defines procedures for succession if head 
removed for political corruption 
* Helps tackle political corruption (which the 
international conventions are relatively lax 
on).  
Establishment of 




* Establishes department liability, civil law 
burden of proof and remedy as fine 
* outlines theory of liability  
* sets specific offences where department liable 
* proposes activities which absolve department of 
liability.  
Helps tie indemnity to liability (criminal 
conventions stubbornly focus on individual 
criminals and ignore systemic nature of 
corruption). 
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Figure 27b: Legislation and Regulation Establishing Financing and Financial Incentives 
 
   
financing 
mechanisms 
* Establishes right to keep proceeds 
from fighting corruption 
* Establishes right to tie (in diminished 
form) pay to performance in fighting 
corruption 
* defines financial arrangements for keeping 
revenues 
* defines specific civil servant actions to merit 
promotion or pay-raises   
Provides vital and missing element to 






OECD Con.  
* Establishes civil burden of proof and 
outlines principles for optimal fine (as 
average level of bribery) and right to 
use to fund AC work 
* Describes evidence requirements and procedures 
for being complaint.  
* Describes procedure for setting fine 
* Describes management of funds and activities to 
be fined by fine.  
Helps with enforcement of OECD 
Convention. Creates layer of liability which is 





* Establishes definitions of direct 
harms and  indirect harms 
 
 
* describes methods of bringing complaint, 
deciding complaint and assessment damages.  
Practical implementation of the “prevention” 





paying qui tam 
rewards 
 
* Establishes rewards for private 
persons based on harms incurred 
* reiterates benefits paid to effective 
government officials for denouncing or 
discovering corruption 
 
* Describes types of offences covered by qui tam 
rewards, procedures for bringing a complaint, and 
relation rewards for civil servants.  
* Provides civil remedy support for 
criminalisation 
* Provides incentives for UN and CoE 
Criminal Conventions to be self-enforcing.  
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*establish three levels of competence 
*assigns  investigation and prosecution 
responsibilities depending on costs and 
benefits 
 
* discusses specific conditions under which 
management and administrative levels retain 
jurisdiction 
* discusses detailed procedures  
Helps create levels of responsibility which 







* Modifies vague prescriptions 
embodied in OECD Convention 
* establishes jurisdiction for OECD 
violations based on judicial quality, 
legal principle and establishes legal 
basis for international transfers of funds 
covering trial costs.  
* describes departments methods of finding 
foreign businessmen paying bribes 
* discusses methods of dealing with civil cases 
(department complaint against businessman)  
* Jurisdictional issue one key reason why 
OECD Convention not applied in practice 
* provides method of funding legal cases 
covered by the Convention. 
asset recovery 
jurisdiction 
* Establish jurisdiction based on 
requesting government’s judicial and 
court system and the cost of executing 
foreign judgments.  
* Establishes principles for distributing 
restituted assets based on harm or other 
theory of justice (between treasury, 
dept, direct victims and indirect 
victims) 
* Establishes procedure for asking for repatriation 
of assets and compensation for harms 
* Establishes method of determining harms  
* Implements the UN Convention (which is 
vague on the matter of how governments 
recover assets in practice).  
 






None  Executive regulation discourages regulation whose 
costs exceeds benefits  




based on risk 
assessment  
 
* Establishes legal basis for using 
random sampling and probes 
* Presents limits of probes (as avoiding 
liability for entrapment)  
* Establish sampling frequencies from various 
populations 
* inform service users of search regime 
* Lowers cost of detecting the corruption 
prosecuted by the conventions 
* Increases probability of detection (thus 
number of prosecutions).  
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Most of these provisions should be legal in most Central and Eastern European 
countries for three reasons. First, the anti-corruption laws in place are vague – presenting 
principles instead of concrete mechanisms for implementation. The vagueness of national 
legislation, in this case, to some extent, allows executive agencies to implement the regulation 
suggested in this paper.
145 Second, in cases where the national anti-corruption law (and other 
administrative law which directs anti-corruption work) is silent about the legality of the 
suggestions made in this paper, the executive official can rely on already established 
traditions in criminal, civil, and administrative law in defense of regulations which implement 
the regulatory provisions covered in this article.
146 The activities suggested draw on already 
established law and regulation in other contexts and use them for anti-corruption work. Third, 
the administrative and managerial provisions outlined in this article are proportional to the 
offence and entail no significant restriction in the rights of government service users or civil 
servants beyond that already embodied in national legislation.
147   
Conclusions  
 
  The purpose of this paper has been primarily pedagogical – showing policymakers 
how they might apply legal reasoning and economic analysis to regulatory issues raised by the 
international conventions against corruption. In the abstract (without reference to a particular 
country’s legal system), this paper derived a test for corruption, complicity, contributory 
negligence, and appropriate jurisdiction for the investigations and prosecution of national and 
international corruption cases. The paper also presented ways in which regulations 
implementing the anti-corruption conventions could be financed and how damages could be 
allocated between parties. In the last section, the intuitions developed throughout the paper 
were used to suggest a number of articles which may be included in executive agency 
regulation aimed at implementing the OECD, UN and CoE anti-corruption conventions (as 
embodied in national legislation).    
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